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THE JURY AS DEMOCRACY

Jenny Carroll*
ABSTRACT

Almost from the moment the law is set to paper, it is shaped and refined
through acts of interpretation and discretion. Police and prosecutors
choose which cases to investigate, which to charge and how to charge
them. Judges make decisions every day that affect the outcome of cases.
These acts of interpretationand discretion are driven by the perspectives of
those empowered to make them. All too frequently, they reinforce existing
power dynamics. But there are other realms of discretion in criminal law.
Whether seeking to apply a legal standardas instructed or engaging in an
act of nullification, ordinary citizens serving as jurors engage in unique
acts of interpretation, redefining the very concept of the law in terms of
their own lived experiences and expectations. In this, jurors serve a
democratic function that exceeds their minimalist label as "mere fact
finders."
But in this account of the jury, the people who occupy the jury box
matter. To imagine the jury as serving this democratic function is
inevitably to turn to a conversation about the identities of the men and
women who actually serve as jurors. While courts and scholars speak
wistfully of a "representative"jury-one that reflects the community from
which it is drawn-this conversation remains dissatisfying, as it seeks to
compartmentalize discussions of the jury's function and the jury's
composition.
This Paperrejects the separation, instead examining the question of the
jury's composition in the context of its proposedfunction. In the process, a
more nuanced theory ofjury selection emerges-one that recognizes that
while a representative jury matters, the question of what that
representationis andprecisely why it matters shifts as notions offunction
shift. The function this Paper explores is the critical interpretive role the
jury plays within the democratic lawmaking body. Viewed through this
lens, one mustfirst confront the question ofprecisely which community the
jury seeks to represent and how it achieves that representation. In a world
in which different communities may bear the disproportional burden of
lawmaking and application, different communities may have a different
stake in the jury itself If so, the use of geographicallydefinedjurisdictions
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to produce venire panels may cease to make sense. Likewise, the value of
proportional representation on individual juries, while promoting some
functions, may undermine the jury's democratic viability. Specifically, and
perhaps ironically, disproportionate representation on individual juries
may actually promote the jury's democratic function. Even more
fundamentally the very definitions of "community" and "identity" become
fluid in the context of a democratically driven jury that serves as a forum
for citizens to constantly realign their own allegiances as they attempt to
apply the law to the defendant and so define the law's limits in their own
lives. In shifting this conversation aboutjury composition, the possibility of
thejury as a unique democraticspace emerges.
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INTRODUCTION

Almost from the moment the law is set to paper, it is shaped and
refined through acts of interpretation and discretion. Most of these acts
occur in formal realms. Police and prosecutors choose which cases to
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investigate, which to charge and how to charge.' Judges make large and
small decisions every day that affect the outcome of particular cases. Even
the earliest decisions a judge makes-to issue a warrant, to find probable
cause based on the barest of legal affidavits, to release a defendant
pretrial-can impact the outcome of the case. By the time a defendant's
case moves towards resolution, the exercise of judicial interpretation and
discretion is more prosaic: Is the objection sustained or overruled? Is the
evidence admissible or not? Should the court apply leniency in sentencing?
The list is nearly endless, but each one, even the most rote, pushes the law
away from the static construct of its legislative creation toward a more
nuanced understanding. All too frequently, these formal acts of
interpretation and discretion are driven by the perspectives of those
empowered to make them, whether by election, employment, or
appointment. In the process, existing power dynamics are maintained and
different communities are left to bear the weight of these discretionary
decisions disproportionally.
But there are other realms of discretion in criminal law as well, ones
that offer the potential at least to grant a forum for marginalized
perspectives. 2 Whether parsing a factual question, seeking to apply a legal
standard as instructed, or engaging in an act of nullification, ordinary
citizens serving as jurors engage in unique acts of interpretation, redefining
the very concept of the law in terms of their own lived experiences and
expectations. While jurors may simultaneously serve many other roles, it is
this complex interpretive capacity that opens the possibility of a democratic
function that transcends the singularity of the verdict. In the space of the
jury room, jurors become a source of law as they contemplate the
defendant's fate, mapping the law across their own lives in the process. As
the debate over the function of the criminal jury rages in the courts and
among scholars, the reality of the jury's interpretive power lingers.
In this regard, the jury's ultimate answer of "guilty" or "not guilty" is
deceptively simple. To unpack this answer is to acknowledge that the juries
serve functions beyond that of mere fact finders-their verdicts set the
law's scope and power in their world. But to imagine the jury as serving a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. This Article has benefited
greatly from the comments of Adam Steinman, Alice Ristroph, Maggie Lewis, Charles Sullivan,
Michael Risinger, L. Song Richardson, Andrew Ferguson, Paul Butler, Michael Cahill, Dan Markel,
Jocelyn Simonson, Darryl Brown, and Rachel Godsil. In addition, I would extend a special thanks to
Sam Schott and the editorial staff at the Alabama Law Review whose patience and careful attention to
detail improved this piece. Of course, all errors are mine alone.
1. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 12

(2007).
2. See Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 579 (2014); Heather Gerken,
Foreword: FederalismAll the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REv. 4, 9 (2010).
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democratic function that encompasses the power to exercise interpretive
discretion is inevitably to turn to a conversation about the identities of the
men and women who actually serve as jurors.3 If a jury's verdict serves
some lawmaking function, then who serves as a juror matters. The
conversation to date centers on the need for a "representative" jury-one
that reflects the community from which it is drawn, but this conversation
is inevitably dissatisfying as long as it seeks to compartmentalize
discussions of the jury's function and discussions of the jury's composition.
It leaves critical questions unanswered.
Precisely what community should the jury represent? In the face of
other discretionary decisions, it seems odd to suggest that all communities
are equally affected by either crime or the enforcement of criminal law.
Particular populations, and frequently particular geographic spaces, often
shoulder a disproportionate impact. Should these most affected
communities have a stronger stake in the representative jury? Should a
local jury be composed of ever more compact circles of eligible venire?
Not unrelated, how should representation be defined? Is descriptive
representation sufficient, or is a more holistic construct of representation
required-one that seeks to account not only for varying perspectives, but
the deliberative conditions that will allow those perspectives to emerge?
Should concepts of vicinage remain tethered to jurisdictional boundaries
defined geographically? Or should the concept of a local jury be
reimagined to account for shifting citizen identities and allegiances?
At the heart of these questions is a conversation about the jury's
function. To reject the separation between the jury's composition and the
jury's function is to shift the discussion towards a more nuanced
conception of jury selection and the ideal of "representativeness." It is to
recognize that while a representative jury matters, the question of what that
representation is and precisely why it matters shifts as notions of function
shift. If one accepts that the jury serves a critical interpretive function
within the democratic lawmaking body, then concepts of juror composition
must also shift. Without this shift, the recognition of the jury's democratic
function will ring hollow. Citizens will fear the power of the jury's verdict
to engage in rogue acts of lawmaking. The populist interpretive power of
the jury will be lost, ceded to safer, more formal realms.
To preserve the potential of the juror's interpretative function without
undermining our faith in the jury system, then, requires a multilevel
approach. This Paper initiates a new conversation with regard to jury
selection, concluding that prior allegiances to proportional representation
3. See Carroll, Nullificationas Law, supra note 2, at 626.
4. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-66 (1979).
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on individual juries are misplaced. Instead, there may be significant
benefits attained through disproportionate juries and venires constructed
with an acknowledgement of diverse communities' different experiences
under the law. This requires, in turn, a re-conception of how we speak of
jury selection itself-one informed by the jury's potential as a democratic
actor. I begin my analysis in Part I by considering the different functions of
the jury - as fact finders, educators, and members of the larger communal
democracy. From there, in Part II, I consider the current jury selection
jurisprudence, examining how the Court's construction of the jury supports
or undermines particular functions. In Part III, I turn to the rich and
emerging literature on deliberative processes, considering how what is
known about group decision-making processes can inform arguments
surrounding jury function and composition. Finally, in Part IV, I conclude
that current allegiances to notions of a "majoritarian jury" and the use of
geographically defined jurisdictions to produce venire panels may not make
sense in light of the jury's larger democratic function. First, given the
nature of the jury's inquiry, a majoritarian position simply may not exist, at
least not in the way that such a position is ordinarily described. Second,
venires that acknowledge the disproportionate impact of the law on
particular populations may actually promote the jury's unique role within
the democracy. These realizations are informed by literature exploring the
5
potential of second order diversity on non-aggregate bodies such as juries,
but also by the reality that concepts of culpability and identity are fluid.
The jury, in fact, can serve as a forum for citizens to realign their own
allegiances as they attempt to apply the law to the defendant.
I. THE JURY'S FUNCTION
The precise borders of the criminal jury's function are not well defined.
The Court itself has recognized that the jury plays different, often
interlocking, roles within the democracy, 6 some more limited than others in
their power to drive the construction and interpretation of law. Juries
educate the public and provide transparency in an otherwise opaque and
distant process. They are a mechanism for public participation in the
criminal justice system, giving citizens a rare and direct stake in the
application and interpretation of law. These educative and participatory
5. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1099, 1106-08
(defining second order diversity as "seek[ing] variation among decisionmaking bodies, not
them") (emphasis omitted).
6. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (noting that the criminal jury offers a
opportunity for democratic participation); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 1556-57
(describing the jury's role as a check on government power).

(2005)
within
unique
(1968)
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functions in turn boost the community's confidence in the verdict any given
jury ultimately reaches. Juries also serve as a check on the power of
government, accepting or rejecting attempted applications of the law.
Citizens participating as jurors can shore up or, at times, undermine the
community's confidence in the actions of formal government actors and the
criminal justice process itself.7
But jurors serve another important potential function: they inject
community value into the law itself. In their deliberations and verdicts, they
force the law out of the realm of the theoretical, into the space of their own
lives. Juries, and the citizens who comprise it, become active participants in
governance-commanding the law to respond to the citizen's vision as the
citizen seeks to conform to its strictures. This role of the jury in creating
law, though small in its empire of a single verdict, nonetheless serves a
critical democratic function-grounding the law in the living world of the
citizens whose obedience it commands. In each of these functions the jury
takes on increasing power and potential to shape the law, but these
functions are not mutually exclusive of one another. While some are
admittedly more controversial than others, an examination of each informs
a meaningful discussion of jury composition.
A.

The Jury's Communitarianand DemocraticFunctions

On some primary level, the criminal jury serves a series of
communitarian functions. The jury box is, literally and figuratively, a space
for the public to be included in, and witness, the criminal justice process.
In this function, the jury is simultaneously a moment of public participation
similar to other moments of enfranchisement,9 a tool of public education,10

7.

For recent examples of this on the grand jury level consider the decisions not to indict the

officers involved in the deaths of Eric Garner on Staten Island, New York, and Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri. See Reaction to Eric Garner Grand Jury Decision, N.Y. TIMES CITY RooM

BLOG (Dec. 3, 2014, 2:22 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/the-death-of-ericgamer-the-grand-jury-decision/?_r-O; Tierney Sneed, Garner, Brown Decisions Sparks Callsfor Grand

Jury

Reform,

U.S.

NEWS

&

WORLD

REP.

(Dec.

12,

2014,

12:17

PM),

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/12/12/after-eric-gamer-michael-brown-decisions-calls-for-

grand-jury-reform.
8. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (noting that "with the exception of voting, for
most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in
the democratic process").
9.
See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364-66; Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as PoliticalParticipation

Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 203, 218-20 (1995).
10. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 93-94
(1998); ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION 23-24 (2013); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318

(Arthur Goldhammer trans., Literary Classics 2004) (1835) (noting that "the jury ... is also the most
effective means of the teaching people how to rule"); Vikram David Amar, supra note 9, at 218-20;
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and a source of public confidence in the verdict and the process which
produces it." Alexis de Tocqueville described the American jury system as
a training ground for self-governance, educating the citizenry and
establishing a critical link that promoted other methods of civic
involvement. He wrote: "[The jury] places actual control of society in the
hands of the governed, . . . rather than of the government."l 2 He continued
that juries prepared people "to be free," instilling in them a sense of duty to
their community.13 He concluded that the jury "should be seen as a free
school that is always open, to which each juror comes to learn about his
rights, . . . and receives practical instruction in the law."l 4 This description
is consistent with the Founders' vision of the jury as a critical link to other
rights of political participation.' 5 These sentiments are echoed in the
Court's modern description of the right to jury trial.16
The criminal jury system also serves a vital communitarian function as
a check on the power of formal government.' 7 Citizens sitting as jurors

John Gastil et al., Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of the Connection Between Jury

Deliberationand PoliticalParticipation,64 J. POL. 585 (2002).
11.

See George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and the

Rights of the Accused, 74 NEB. L. REV. 804, 808 (1995) (noting that the presence of diverse groups on
the jury is one way to ensure the public's confidence in a verdict and the process that produced it).
12. TOCQUEVILLE,supra note 10, at 250-51.

13.
14.

Id. at 252-53.
Id.

15. John Adams wrote extensively about the jury as a component of the budding democracy. He
argued that "the common people [as jurors], should have as complete a control . . . in every judgment of
a court of judicature" as they have in the other branches of government, and that it was "not only [the
juror's] right, but his duty . . to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment,
and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court." 2 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS,
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 253-55 (1971). His vision

of the jury was driven in no small part by his fear that judges "being few ... might be easily corrupted;
being commonly rich and great, they might learn to despise the common people, and forget the feelings
of humanity, and then the subject's liberty and security would be lost." Letter from John Adams
(signing as Earl of Clarendon) to William Pym (Jan. 27, 1766), in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF

JOHN ADAMS 51, 55 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000). In short, he envisioned a jury described by
Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835 that "teaches men the practice of equity." TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 10,

at 320; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991);
Vikram David Amar, supranote 9, at 218.

16. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (analogizing jury service to voting rights);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (same).
17.

See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *342; THE

FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 558, 564 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that
whatever misgiving one might have about the criminal jury that "the trial by jury must still be a
valuable check upon corruption"); THOMAS JEFFERSON, The Administration ofJustice and Description
ofthe Laws?, in NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 140, 140 (Richmond, J.W. Randolph 1853) (stating
that the best hope for the citizenry lies with the citizen jury rather than the government that might seek

to curtail citizens' rights); Akhil Reed Amar, supra note 15, at 1182-90; Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury's
Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. 657 (2012) (describing the role of the jury as a check on the power of
government); Carroll, Nullification as Law, supra note 2, at 588-89 (describing the jury's power to
reconstruct law through verdict as a vital component of its ability to check the power of government);
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engage in direct self-government, curtailing or accepting the formal
construction, application, or interpretation of law. 8 In the process, and in
the context of the case before it, the jury offers an opportunity for the
people to ensure that the law reflects their own values and expectations.19
This function of the jury is not without its controversy. While the
Founders' descriptions of the criminal jury are replete with references to
the juror's right to review questions of law and their role as source of legal
meaning, the Supreme Court adopted the opposite view a century later; by
1895, jurors in federal court were instructed that they were not permitted to
consider questions of law but, rather, were consigned to a role of fact
finder.20 While the jury's power to consider questions of law persisted and
persists, it does so as an unsanctioned act. 2 1 Despite this apparent
curtailment of the jury's function as a source of law, recent Supreme Court
precedent has suggested a reinvigoration of this role. The Court has
harkened back to the Founders' rhetoric of the jury as a political actor. In
incorporating the Sixth Amendment's right to jury trial to the states, the
Court defined the prime purpose of the right to a jury trial as "to prevent
oppression by the [g]overnment" and "[flear of unchecked power." 2 2 In the
context of criminal cases, such protections were rooted in an "insistence
upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence."23
More recently, in a line of decisions beginning with Apprendi v. New
24
Jersey, the Court has suggested a renaissance of the underlying sentiment

Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving Thomas Jefferson 's Jury: Sparf and Hansen v. United States

Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 353, 388 (2004) ("Revolutionary colonials refused to define law
as an instrument of the state which could not be judged by the common man. Rather, they viewed it as

the reflection of their community which ordinary men were equally capable of judging for
themselves.").
18. See Carroll, Nullification as Law, supra note 2, at 588; see also Paul Butler, Racially Based

Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 705 (1995)
(describing the power of jurors to push for new constructs of law through nullified verdicts); Alan
Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours ofa Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 68-69 (describing the jury as a "social barometer" that measures the
community's acceptance of formal creation, application, and interpretation of the law).

19.
20.

See Carroll,Nullification as Law, supranote 2, at 620.
See Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 64-80 (1895).

21.

As will be discussed in a moment, it may be that such acts of legal interpretation do occur,

though in an unrecognized fashion. Courts or scholars may fail to detect them for a variety of reasons,
and the jurors themselves may fail to identify them as acts of legal interpretation generally or as acts
prohibited by the jury instructions.
22. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968). The Court in Duncan acknowledged that
the literal and figurative wisdom of permitting juries to consider complex legal matters had long been a
subject of debate but concluded that when jurors arrived at different conclusions than judges, they
fulfilled the purposes for which they were created-to check the government's power and to ground the

law in the community's values. See id at 156-57.
23. Id. at 156.
24. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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surrounding the jury's political function, if not the right to contemplate
questions of law itself.
While confining its discussion to the nature of factual questions the
jury must consider, 2 5 Apprendi rests on the historical principle that citizens
serving as jurors push the law to account for communal values. Without
this opportunity for the citizenry to engage in law interpretation, the law
may become static, mechanical, and unable to account for those it seeks to
represent. Apprendi embraces the jury's role as a "guard against a spirit of
oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers [and to function] as the great
bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties." 2 6 Subsequent cases in the line
describe the criminal jury as central to governance serving as a
"circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of justice"27 and note that jurors
adopt a democratic function when they enter the arenas where law is
constructed through their own acts of interpretation. 2 8
This rhetoric draws heavily from the Founders' description of the
criminal jury as serving a vital role in the democracy. That this democratic
function would be tied to a group of citizens whose empire was limited to a
verdict in a single case may seem counterintuitive. Jurors, after all, serve a
limited tenure and have no special capacity beyond their appointment as
jurors. But jury service can transcend such limitations when jurors, whether
seeking to apply a legal standard as instructed or engaging in an act of
nullification, interpret and redefine the very concept of the law not in terms
of formality but in terms of their own lived experiences and expectations.
As such, the jury becomes a bridge between a law created, applied, and
interpreted in formal spaces by formal actors, and the governed
community. But this idea of the jury-one that straddles the worlds where
formal power creates law and where citizens as jurors reshape it with their
own normative visions-stands in the shadow of the jury's institutional
history. If the Founders imagined a jury steeped in the ideal of citizen
righteousness, it was quickly supplanted by an institution better suited in its
exclusive construct to enforce existing power dynamics, just like its formal
counterparts. Whatever heroic tales nullifying juries may have spun in

25. See id at 476-77 ("[A]ny fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be . .. proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Jones v. United States,

526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. Id. at 477 (second alteration in original) (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1873)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

27.
28.

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
See id at 306-07 ("The jury could not function as circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of

justice if it were relegated to making a determination that the defendant at some point did something
wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime the State actually seeks to

punish.").
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response to the law's more formal narrative, they were drowned in a sea of
verdicts rendered by juries that served to enforce local prejudice and
oppression, rather than to strike a blow for the common man.
To speak, then, of a jury interpreting or remaking law is to speak of a
rogue and dangerous moment. It is to evoke an ongoing memory of juries
exercising their power of discretion to produce oppressive results-even in
the face of progressive exercises of discretion by the formal branches. It is
to confront the inevitable question: how can we, as a community, trust the
jury, in its obscure deliberative process and exclusive construction to
represent us all in their verdict?
As a nation we are rightly haunted by memories of rogue juries. By
many accounts, the jury as an institution is a risky proposition. Unlike
elected officials, juries deliberate and decide in backrooms and behind
closed doors. They have no obligation to divulge the basis for their
decisions-if they recognize them in the first place. As parties and judges
choose the jury and assign its role, the citizen has little power to oppose the
chosen jury, or even those eligible to be chosen. Those chosen, even under
the best of systems, may still give pause. Jurors serve because they are
ordinary, not extraordinary. What renders a citizen a good juror may be the
very characteristics that would make us reluctant to elect or appoint them to
decide important matters in our own lives. They are simultaneously
everything like us-common citizens-and nothing like us-not required,
and at times not able, to accurately reflect the very population they purport
to represent. They have no special expertise or knowledge (if they did they
would be unlikely to survive voir dire). They do not have to be leaders or
heroes or geniuses. They need only be eligible to be summoned (a
designation that excludes swaths of the community even in its best forms)
and appear when called for jury duty.
Once chosen, there is no continuity to their tenure. They render their
verdict and leave the jury box. We as a community have little standing to
participate in the process by which they are selected. We have no place in
the room where they debate and decide their verdicts in our names. In some
jurisdictions we are not even entitled to learn their names.29 We live instead
with their decision alone-responding only after the fact, if at all.
Ironically, perhaps, the very characteristics which make jurors reliable
make it difficult to trust them as a collective group. They are an everyday

29.

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.

§

1863(b)(7) (2012) (providing that federal district courts may empanel

an anonymous jury in a non-capital case "where the interests of justice so require"); United States v.

Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 371-74 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing various circuit court decisions defining when
anonymous juries may be empaneled); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1520 (11th Cir. 1994)
(identifying the five factors emphasized by courts when finding "[s]ufficient reason for empaneling an
anonymous jury").
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unknown-ordinary in every way until chosen for a limited and secretive
tenure of service in our names. The trepidation we might feel at the outset
over the legitimacy of their decision-making prowess is compounded by
the possibility that their verdict might extend beyond a judgment of factual
questions to something far more complex-an assessment of culpability
and, perhaps, a different understanding of law. A verdict that has the
potential to be an indicator of our collective comfort with the law-whether
in its formal construction or application or interpretation-is also one that
may well exceed the boundaries of the case in which it was rendered.
Admittedly, to transcend the singularity of their role, jurors must either
deliver verdicts that garner national attention in their shocking and apparent
departure from expectation, or they must wait until their verdicts aggregate
and, in the process, force some meaningful change through formal
government process. But even the small moment of the verdict can take on
a larger democratic significance when that verdict suggests that the jury did
not accept the formally constructed law. In this instance, even the single
verdict can signal a divergence between the law as constructed and the law
as lived or imagined by the citizens. This signaling capacity may drive
change that republican democracy cannot, forcing the law to become
nimbly responsive in ways that formal powers often fail to be. To the
extent that the composition of the jury matters, it matters especially when
the conversation shifts toward this larger democratic function-the shaping
of law to reflect communal values.
B.

What the Jury Does, Even When It Judges Facts

Lurking beneath the surface of the discussion of the jury's grander
functions is the reality that jurors are charged with determining the facts of
any given case. This task is deceptively simple in its description. When
citizens sit in judgment on a criminal case, they determine the culpability of
the defendant. Their factual conclusions may well drive this decision (as
opposed to their conclusions about the law), but these mere factual
determinations carry a weight that conclusions of facts in other contexts
lack. Even in systems in which juries do not participate in the sentencing of
the defendant (and perhaps remain blissfully unaware of the practical
consequences of their verdicts), their guilty verdict is a necessary
prerequisite to the state's use of force as punishment. 30 While the executive
30.

Many judges argue that criminal juries should be allowed to hear evidence of the defendant's

potential sentence prior to determining guilt precisely because the jurors are making decisions that far
exceed what one ordinarily thinks of as a factual determination. See United States v. Polizzi, 549 F.

Supp. 2d 308, 406-08 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009) (arguing that a jury
should hear evidence of the defendant's potential sentencing range before rendering a verdict and
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may determine the application of the law writ large, juries have the ultimate
say writ small-accepting or declining the executive's invitation to enforce
the law against a defendant and to move him from the category of accused
to convicted.3 1

Unpacking a question of culpability requires some examination of who
deserves conviction and punishment. The complexity of this inquiry far
exceeds the apparent binary choice between guilty or not guilty.
Overwhelmingly this examination occurs in a public space controlled by
the formal brokers of power. The legislative branch defines the boundaries
of a crime and establishes a punishment regime. The executive, in a myriad
of enforcement decisions, defines any particular person's eligibility to be
prosecuted. The judiciary parses and interprets the law, defining further the
parameters of its reach. But finally, in the quiet and decidedly non-public
space of a jury room, twelve ordinary citizens are left to place the law's
formal construct into the context of the lived world by answering either
"guilty" or "not guilty" on the verdict form. 32 In this pivotal moment when
the law leaves the theoretical realm and enters the realm of actuality, the
juror's own concept of the world may shift even a factual determination.33
In this sense, even if one rejects all larger functions of the jury, the
composition of the jury still matters and may drive factual determinations.
Jurors make "subjective" determinations of culpability, even in their
"objective" assessment of facts.
That the verdict may be small and only applicable to the defendant
before the jury does not diminish this reality that even in the determination
of facts, jurors map out the boundaries of the law and the government's
power. Undoubtedly this realization drives both fears that juries are
imperfect vessels to trust with the complex task of defining law-whether
in construction or application-and the notion that juries must be diverse to
function properly. If we truly believed that the province of juries could be
confined to a near rote and objective determination of facts, diversity
should matter less. One plus one equals two whether a white man or a black
woman answers the question. But juries rarely determine such simple
questions, and the consequences of what they do determine are what give
describing the history of juries declining to convict defendants of higher offenses, which carried capital
sentences, despite factual evidence to support such convictions).
31. This argument is admittedly somewhat mitigated by the relative rarity of trials, but even plea
bargains take place in the shadow of potential (or past) verdicts and in a system with limited resources

to allow trials. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463 (2004).
32. See Akhil Reed Amar, supra note 17, at 1183-88 (noting that juries bring the community's
value to bear when rendering verdicts); Carroll, Nullification as Law, supra note 2, at 586.

33. See Aya Gruber, Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 85 U. COLO. L. REv. 129, 151-52
(2014) (arguing that in the application of standards jurors apply their own norms to factual inquiries).
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us pause. On some fundamental level, we see them for what they are. We
fool ourselves with the label of "fact finder" only briefly. In the end we
know that as they contemplate the defendant's fate, they contemplate our
own concept of culpability, guilt, punishment, and law. They toss about our
own uneasy relationship with the government and the law it creates. Unlike
other democratic actors, jurors simultaneously occupy the space as the
decision maker and the citizen. While they certainly serve a representative
function, that function is unlike other democratic representatives. They do
not "represent" the citizens; they are the citizens.
Regardless of what other systematic function one assigns to the jury,
the exclusion of particular members of the population undermines the
function itself, rendering the jury just one more shadowy and exclusive
actor in the elite realm of governance. 3 4 Our faith in this function is driven
or damaged if the process by which the jury is chosen consistently excludes
swaths of the very population its decisions affect.
II. MAKING SENSE OF THE COURT'S JURY SELECTION JURISPRUDENCE: OF
FAIR CROSS SECTIONS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Having briefly laid out the functions of the jury, the question of jury
composition looms. The Sixth Amendment promises defendants an
"impartial jury,"36 but speaking of this promise in terms of the practicalities
of actual defendants and actual juries is complex. Jury selection
jurisprudence has revolved around two doctrines: the fair-cross-section
doctrine and enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. The fair-crosssection doctrine is central to the Court's interpretation of the Impartiality
Clause. The Court has interpreted the Impartiality Clause to require that the
venire members be "drawn from a fair cross section of the community."3
Defendants wishing to raise a fair-cross-section challenge must show that a
"distinctive group" was excluded from the jury; that the group's long-term
representation on jury venires is not "fair and reasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the community"; and that "this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the

34.

See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (arguing that the jury's power as a check

on government is achieved in part by its ability to include all members of the community in its

composition).
35.

See Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of

Affirnative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 707, 709-11 (1993).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed.

37.

Taylor, 419 U.S. at 537.
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[particular] jury-selection process." 3 8 This requirement only applies to
venires, not petit juries, and requires a long range view. 39
Juxtaposed with the Court's fair-cross-section analysis is its
jurisprudence on the Equal Protection Clause. The core of this
jurisprudence is the Batson case line, which prohibits parties from
exercising peremptory strikes based on race or gender.4 0 Batson shifts the
conversation about jury diversity out of the positive terms of the fair-crosssection doctrine and into negative terms. In Batson, the goal becomes not to
empanel a diverse jury, or even to create a system that would make a
diverse jury possible, but to prevent the use of peremptory strikes to
remove jurors. 4 1 This distinction may seem minor, but it is a fundamentally
different way of thinking of both the jury and the value of diversity. In
addition, Batson and its progeny block the parties' ability to adjust the
jury's composition to reflect the community's proportional population by
barring the use of peremptory strikes based on race or gender.42 Only in
thinking of these doctrines in the context of the jury's underlying functions
is it possible to reconcile them and move forward.
At first blush, these two doctrines seem paradoxical. The fair-crosssection doctrine eschews any allegiance to diversity on a particular jury,
requiring diversity over time and only across the venire, while the equal
protection analysis enshrined in the Batson line of cases speaks of diversity
in the negative, prohibiting any party, including the defendant, from
striking a juror based on his membership in a protected class. Neither
would seem to guarantee a diverse jury in any particular case. Yet,
considering the various possible functions of the jury, diversity would seem
critical to achieving at least some of the aims of the system.

38. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-66 (1979). Once a defendant makes this prima facie
fair-cross-section claim, the State must justify the exclusion by citing a "significant state interest." Id. at
367-68; see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (holding that to prove a fair-cross-section violation the
defendant must show systematic exclusion of a distinctive group resulting in unreasonable
underrepresentation of that group on the venire).

39. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 366 (the fair-cross-section analysis considers the jury selection
process as a whole, as opposed to any particular jury); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (the fair-cross-section
requirement only applies to venire panels and does not apply to any particular panel, but rather the
collective venire panels over time).

40. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59
(1992); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 403 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1986).
41.
42.

See supranote 40 and accompanying text.
See supranote 40 and accompanying text.
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The Concept of a DemographicallyRepresentativeJury in Fair-CrossSection and Equal ProtectionJurisprudence

If we view the jury as serving a limited function of educating those
who serve on the jury, the exclusion of some does not upset that function
per se.43 Those who serve on the jury, regardless of their identity, will
achieve that educational benefit.4 But if we imagine the jury serving a
representative function, then the jury's ability to realize that function
swings on its ability to achieve diversity in its composition. This is true in
terms of the jury's descriptive diversity, 45 but also in terms of its
substantive diversity.
Perceptions of legitimacy may be linked to jury composition in
different ways. Descriptive diversity alone on juries may increase public
confidence in a verdict.46 Even in the face of other elite and formal
discretionary decisions that dominate the criminal justice system,47 a
descriptively representative jury offers tangible proof of inclusion. 4 8
Likewise, jurors themselves may be more confident in the trial process and
the verdicts produced if the jury is descriptively diverse.49 In contrast,
verdicts produced by homogenous juries are often viewed with suspicion. 50

43.
note 10.

See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 93-94; Gastil, et al., supra

44. See Vikram David Amar, supra note 15, at 218-20.
45. Social scientists describing electoral representation have coined the terms "descriptively" and
"substantively" representative that seem applicable here in the context of juries. A body that is
"descriptively" representative is one made up of members who reflect traits in proportion to the larger
population. A body that is "substantively" representative is one that reflects the larger population's
interests or values. In the context of electoral law, the theory seems to be that bodies that are
descriptively representative, are also substantively so. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION 112-43 (1967).

&

46. See Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition:
Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2003); Hiroshi Fukurai
Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action in Jury Selection: Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and
Affirmative Juries ofthe Hennepin Model and the Jury de MedietateLinguae, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.

645, 663 (1997); King, supranote 35.
47. See Gruber, supra note 33, at 162 (noting that executive and judicial decision-making bodies
are overwhelmingly dominated by educated white males).
48.

See Ellis & Diamond, supranote 46; King, supra note 35.

49.

See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice and Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 659, 692

(2002) (noting that "jurors' satisfaction with the jury deliberations, the jury experience, and the verdict"
improved with gender and age diversity, but interestingly were not significantly affected by racial

diversity).
50. See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DuKE L.J. 704, 704 (1995) ("Few
statements are more likely to evoke disturbing images of American criminal justice than this one: 'The
defendant was tried by an all-white jury."'). A more recent example of outrage over a verdict produced

by a seemingly homogenous jury (an all female one) occurred in the trial of George Zimmerman for the
killing of Trayvon Martin. See Gruber, supra note 33, at 130.
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That perceptions of legitimacy should be linked to a descriptively
diverse jury makes sense given the nature of the jury itself. Whatever the
Sixth Amendment guarantees for impartiality, there are no such promises
of accountability. Unlike other democratic actors, jurors are neither elected
nor appointed with the accompanying public confirmation process. Their
deliberative processes are closed and shielded from public scrutiny or
inquiry until after the verdict is rendered and, arguably, the damage is
done.5 ' Jurors are chosen and labor in relative obscurity with no
"institutional tether" to the population they represent.52 Jurors are chosen
for their ordinariness and lack of predisposition in a case. 3 There is no
requirement that they be experts in any particular field. Our hope is that
they will learn on the job, processing evidence and legal arguments to reach
a fair verdict with no other skills than their fortune to be called to serve, to
appear for service, and to survive the voir dire process. 54 Mechanisms of
accountability are disabled in the hopes of preserving the jury's impartiality
and independence from the parties to the case or the government
generally. 5 There are few requirements for jury service; jurors are
composed of the ordinary men and women who live and labor under the
law. 56 The verdict forms they are called upon to complete are sufficiently
vague to obscure any divination surrounding deliberation or the jury's basis
for decisions.57 Courts cannot inquire into the basis for jury decisions,58 and

51. See Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 53-54 (1994);
Allison Orr Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567 (2011).
52.

See Richard M. Re, Re-Justifying the FairCross Section Requirement: Equal Representation

and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury, 116 YALE L.J. 1568, 1574 (2007). The Federal
Rules of Evidence actually prohibit jurors from testifying as to their deliberative processes. See FED. R.
EVID. 606 ("[A] juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the
jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental
processes concerning the verdict or indictment.").
53. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 325 (2005).

54. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n.12 (1984) ("The constitutional standard [is] that
a juror is impartial only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court . . . ." (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961))).
55. See Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 122-23 (2009) ("A jury's verdict of acquittal
represents the community's collective judgment regarding all the evidence and arguments presented to

it. Even if the verdict is 'based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation,' its finality is unassailable."
(per curiam) (citation omitted) (quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962))); United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980) (stating that the "public interest in the finality of
criminal judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though the acquittal

was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation" (quoting Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
56. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION, supranote 53, at 325.

57.

See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing a

reluctance to require special verdict forms because of the intrusion on the jury's ability to serve its

independent function); United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1413 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); United
States v. Escobar-Garcia,893 F.2d 124, 126 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Collamore, 868
F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1989) (same);
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acquittals are exempt from review entirely.59 Even the standard for
determining guilt leaves room for jurors to inject values beyond the mere
contemplation of facts.60
While lack of accountability allows jurors to deliberate without fear of
repercussion from formal government,' the absence of a meaningful
mechanism to hold jurors accountable for their verdicts also renders
inclusion (and a demographically proportional composition) all the more
important to ensure a sense that verdicts reflect the community's values. 6 2
This suggests that regardless of the "substantive accuracy" of the jury's
verdict, the perceived legitimacy of that verdict is linked at least in part to
the jury's ability to accurately reflect the population of the community it
purports to represent.
But descriptively diverse juries may tend to be substantively diverse as
well, or at least more open to diverse perspectives.63 The presence of
female jurors and jurors of color alters the deliberative process, regardless
of whether or not those individuals present a unique ideological
perspective. 64 In short, the conversation about culpability changes when
descriptively diverse populations are included. As jurors are asked to
determine facts and to apply objective standards in their assessment of
culpability, they inevitably draw on their own experiences and
65
s
A jury that shares no common experiences with the
expectations.
defendant may find it difficult to contextualize his defense. These jurors
may find the defendant's narrative unpersuasive and his. decision-making
processes foreign. The reasonableness of the defendant's action or his
claim that doubts persist may ring hollow if the jury cannot find itself in
United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 1982) (same); Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d
706, 714-15 (D.C. 1976) (en banc) (same); State v. Hardison, 492 A.2d 1009, 1015-16 (N.J. 1985)
(same); People v. Ribowsky, 568 N.E.2d 1197, 1201 (N.Y. 1991) (same).
58. See United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The purpose of affording
a right to have the jury polled is not to invite each juror to reconsider his decision, but to permit an
inquiry as to whether the verdict is in truth unanimous.").

59.

U.S. CONST. amend. V (the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the state from appealing an

acquittal).
60.
61.

See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
See Simon Stem, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating

Rationales for Jury Nullification After Bushell's Case, Il l YALE L.J. 1815 (2002) (noting that the
absence ofjudicial review ofjury verdicts allows jurors to vote without fear of reprisal).

62.

See Re, supra note 52, at 1574.

63.

See Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A

Contingent "Yes ", 61 J. POL. 628 (1999).
64.

See David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A

Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3 (2001); Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The
Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C.

L. REv. 2031, 2105 (2010).
65. See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003); Gruber, supra note 33.
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him or his story. Without a diverse perspective, jurors applying a
purportedly objective standard may merely serve to reinforce dominant
cultural norms.66
These norms, though dominant, may fail to account for the
unarticulated ideals of the community-ideals that may bubble to surface
in the jury's contemplation of a particular case. Questions of culpability are
complex and multidimensional in the context of the defendant's life. As
will be discussed further in Part IV, even jurors who stake a claim to a
position in the abstract may find themselves carving exceptions into that
position in light of the evidence they hear and the ability of either party's
narrative to resonate with the jurors. This suggests that a diverse jury is
more likely to render a verdict that not only appears more legitimate, but
actually reflects the community's multidimensional norms and values,
particularly in the context of the defendant's life.67
The Court's own account of the importance of inclusion on juries
recognizes that descriptive diversity can produce substantive diversity as
well.68 The Court has repeatedly emphasized the value of diversity of views
as a means to ensure quality deliberation and critical reflection.69

66. See Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1043, 1066
(2005); Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 813, 818 (1992)
(arguing that when objective standards are applied by those already in positions of power, those
"standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture"). Various scholars have suggested

mechanisms to shift the application of objective standards to account for differences between the fact
finder's perspective and the defendant's. Cynthia Lee has suggested asking jurors to analyze the
defendant's reasonableness by "switching" the identities of the defendant and the alleged victim. LEE,

supra note 65, at 252-59; see also Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who
Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71 (1992) (arguing that the application of
objective standards by privileged jurors to defendants outside the corridors of power serves to reinforce
existing power dynamics regardless of the "justice" of the resulting verdict); Victoria Nourse, Passion's
Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997) (same);
Emily L. Miller, Comment, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal

Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665 (2001) (same).
67.

See Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox:Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and

the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 144 (1996) (arguing that a descriptively representative jury is
more likely to account for varied perspectives and so more likely to achieve substantive representation

in any particular community); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really
Know About Race and Juries?A Review ofSocial Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv.

997, 1030 (2003) (noting that the presence of diverse perspectives on the jury increases the quality of
deliberations).

68. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975) (noting that excluding women from juries
diminishes the perspectives of the deliberating body); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972)
(plurality opinion) (excluding groups "deprives the jury of a perspective on human events"); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946) (holding that women possess "a flavor, a distinct quality"
relevant to jury deliberations); see also Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835,

1893 (2005) (noting "that women might be entitled to a 'jury of their peers' because men and women
might reason differently about moral or legal guilt").

69. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 134 (1994) (citing Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233 (1978).
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The fair-cross-section doctrine arguably achieves this accuracy in
representation by providing the defendant with the "fair possibility" of
being judged by a jury that reflects the demographics of the community.70
Put another way, it promises any given segment of the population a fair
possibility of being chosen for a jury. Viewed through a lens of
functionalism, however, the fair-cross-section "promise" is problematic.
From the perspective of the citizenry, the possibility of being chosen for a
jury does not necessarily include actual opportunity to serve, and from the
perspective of the defendant it does not include the actual opportunity to
have a representative jury in his particular case.
Nonetheless, the Court has declined to extend the fair-cross-section
requirement to the petit jury. 7 This seems odd. The Sixth Amendment,
after all, references the jury itself-not the venire, which is only the
mechanism by which petit juries are assembled and chosen. Beyond this, if
the goal of the fair-cross-section doctrine is to protect the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury, and demographic proportionality
ensures this impartiality at least in part, then it would seem that the faircross-section requirement should apply to each jury rendering a verdict.7 2
Setting aside momentarily the inevitable critique of the difference
between a "fair possibility" of representation and actual representation, it is
worth recognizing that efforts to achieve demographic accuracy on juries is
challenging in and of itself. The size of the jury by its very nature demands
exclusion.7 3 There are only so many seats in the jury box.
The nature of identity itself further complicates the equation. To define
the characteristics that render any given person "representative" is,
inevitably, to categorize and prioritize competing aspects of who the person
is and why a particular trait matters. To date, the Court has relied on the
presence of immutable traits such as race and gender to determine whether

70.
71.

See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990); Taylor, 419 U.S. 522.
See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (noting that even while holding that women could not be

excluded from juries based on their status as women "we impose no requirement that petit juries
actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the

population").
72. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 371 n.* (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[1]f 'that
indefinable something' [possessed by female jurors] were truly
right to trial by an impartial jury, a defendant would be entitled
in perfect proportion to their numbers in the community.");
Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Representation,

an essential element of the due process
to a jury composed of men and women
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting:
52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 369-71 (1999);

Gerken, supra note 5, at 1115 ("[A]lmost any theory that would explain why we care about a pool that
mirrors the population would also favor a jury that does the same.").
73. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986) (noting the "practical impossibility of
providing each criminal defendant with a truly 'representative' petit jury").
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a fair cross section has been achieved.7 4 But identities, even of those who
possess permanent and immutable traits, are not themselves permanent or
singular in their perspective. In this sense, descriptive representation can
serve only as a proxy to inform the community of whether or not every
eligible member has had an opportunity to participate and whether
substantive representation is achieved through that participation. As will be
discussed further in Part IV, one of the unique features of the jury system is
that it may open spaces for competing aspects of the citizen's identity to
emerge. Just as questions of culpability are multidimensional, so are
constructs of identity. At any given moment a citizen may find herself
balancing competing allegiances as she seeks to engage in the larger body
politic.
Beyond these practical concerns, application of the fair-cross-section
doctrine to petit juries would seem to contrary to the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence, which prohibits the use of peremptory strikes
based on the race or gender of the juror.7 5 This creates an odd dynamic in
which the Court simultaneously recognizes the value of diversity in the
context of fair cross section analysis while prohibiting any partyincluding a defendant-from using diversity characteristics to select a
jury.76 Taken one step further, the Court's Equal Protection Clause

jurisprudence would appear to preclude some remedies for violations of the
fair-cross-section doctrine. Applying this model to the petit jury only
muddles the dilemma. Given Batson's prohibition on racially preferential
selection, achieving a fair cross section on any individual jury seems more
akin to a happy coincidence than a constitutionally mandated (or desirable)
plan.78 By limiting the fair-cross-section requirement to the venire panel,
74.

Id. at 175 (identifying women, African-Americans, and Hispanics as improperly excluded

groups).

75. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407
(1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
76.

See Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical

Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 965 (1998) ("A defendant is thus placed in a strange position: he is
entitled to a jury drawn from a fair cross section specifically because it increases the odds that different
groups and perspectives will be represented in the jury pool, which in turn helps ensure that the panel is
impartial; when actually seating a jury, however, he may not take those same characteristics into

account.").
77. See John P. Bueker, Note, Jury Source Lists: Does Supplementation Really Work?, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 390, 430-31 (1997) (noting that one way to increase representation with a jury

system would be to modify the selection process to afford members of minority groups a greater
probability of being selected). Courts have attempted such remedies only to see them struck down. See,
e.g., United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d. 1092 (6th Cir. 1998) (striking down a policy of removing
nonblack citizens from the venire jury wheels so as to achieve proportional representation of black
jurors).
78. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (stating in the context of
civil juries that "if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too

high to meet the standard of the Constitution"); Ellis & Diamond, suprq note 46, at 1051.
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the Court has avoided this head-on conflict with its Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment jury selection jurisprudence. Such avoidance, however, does
not mitigate the inconsistency that bubbles around the edges of each
doctrine.
More globally, linking the jury's representative function to a directly
proportional petit jury contradicts underlying principles of modem jury
selection. Modem jury jurisprudence counsels towards a randomization of
the selection process as a means of ensuring fairness. This effort of
randomization is laid over vicinage requirements mandating that juries be
drawn from the district where the alleged crime occurred. 7 9 A byproduct of
vicinage (a perhaps not accidental one given the federalism debates at the
Founding that still smolder today) is the creation of micro-jurisdictions
within macro- ones. As populations vary among districts, states, and
regions, any given randomly selected jury may simultaneously reflect the
micro-jurisdiction it was drawn from, while failing to represent the larger
macro-jurisdiction's population.80 To the extent that jury selection
jurisprudence aligns itself with the notion that a random jury will both
avoid the possibility of entrenched bias and produce consistent verdicts
(and so the application of law across districts) this may be problematic. In
the context of vicinage requirements, the fair-cross-section doctrine
promises representation only on a micro-jurisdictional level.8 ' As a result,
juries and the verdicts they produce may both satisfy the fair-cross-section
requirement for the micro-jurisdiction, while nonetheless fail to represent
the larger macro-jurisdiction's viewpoint. This in turn raises the twin
specters that the jury will not be perceived as representative by the larger
community-it will, in fact, lack the broad range of perspectives the Court
recognizes as critical to effective deliberation and acceptance of the verdict
as legitimate-and that the verdicts among micro-jurisdictions may be
inconsistent. The fair-cross-section doctrine tolerates such inconsistencies.
It is violated only by a demonstration of underrepresentation over time and
within the jurisdiction in which the defendant was tried.82

79. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that a defendant is entitled to a "jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed"); Jury Selection and Service Act (JSSA) of 1968,
28 U.S.C. § 1863 (2012) (requiring that federal juries be randomly selected within designated
geographic restraints).
80.

See Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and the

Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 79, 109 (2004).
81. See United States v. Ashley, 54 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1995) (declining to create new jury
districts or to combine existing jury districts in an effort to increase diversity under a fair-cross-section
claim).
82. See Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A ConstitutionalArgument, 75 N.Y.U. L.

REv. 1658, 1702 (2000).
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The notion of vicinage raises an additional question: Which community
is the jury meant to represent? Vicinage arguments supported not only a
strong anti-Federalism streak present at the Founding, but also an
enforcement ideal that those who made the hard decisions regarding a
particular defendant's culpability should be those most affected by the
alleged crime itself-the men, and later women, who lived in the shadow
of the crime and the law's enforcement. In the face of executive
discretionary decisions, it seems odd to suggest that all communities are
equally affected either by crime or the enforcement of criminal law.
Particular populations, and frequently particular geographic spaces, often
shoulder a disproportionate burden of law enforcement. Arguably, these
most affected communities have a stronger stake in the representative jury.
In short, jury service should allow them to lay claim to, and to push back
on, the power exercised by formal branches in ways that they were unable
to in other democratic and electoral processes. As will be discussed further
in Part IV, if we are to take seriously the purported goals of the fair-crosssection and equal protection doctrines as promoting the jury's functionincluding larger democratic functions-the concept of vicinage may need
to be redefined, with the resulting jury becoming a realm where those with
the greatest stake are represented most greatly. Admittedly, the Court has
not adopted this approach, or even deigned to speak of it, but it seems an
ever-present yet glossed-over question.
Perhaps the Court's reluctance to require proportional representation on
each jury transcends concerns about practicalities or long-established jury
selection processes. Rather, the Court has come to accept that descriptive
representation may only achieve a portion of its desired effect. Embedded
in this realization is a different account of why diversity matters. Certainly
it creates an appearance of representation: women will see fellow women
sitting on the jury; Latinos, fellow Latinos; blacks, fellow blacks. There is a
value in this visual of participation, but it will not guarantee or necessarily
create substantive representation. Worse, linking a particular juror to a
community and designating him or her the representative of all who share
his or her trait may undermine the ability to engage in the deliberative
process. 83 The juror's deliberation would become disconnected to the case
and would become yet another generalized political statement, undermining
the community's faith in the verdict. 84 That interest voting may not occur,
83.

See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY

140 (1994) (contending that jurors selected for their race may believe they represent a particular
perspective and "would be less prepared to enter into the kind of independent and impartial
deliberations that historically have differentiated jury behavior from voting behavior").
84. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 243-45 (1997); Eric M. Albritton,
Race-Conscious Grand Juror Selection: The Equal Protection Clause and Strict Scrutiny, 31 AM. J.

2015]

The Jury as Democracy

847

or that members selected for a particular trait may fail to fall within the
neat stereotypes that drove the party to choose them (or more accurately
not to strike them) in the first place,85 may be of little consequence. The
damage to the verdict's legitimacy, and the jury system as a whole, may be
done if the larger public believes that the jury is merely one more forum in
which citizens act as proxies for larger political agendas driven by far more
formal actors.86 The Founders' vision that the jury serve a unique role in
governance--controlling a small but vital empire where the particular
application of a law was weighed by the community-is lost, in part, if the
jury's deliberation becomes nothing more than an allegiance to dogmas
established in other political processes. It potentially ceases to serve a
unique function. 87 This suggests that the value of representation as a
function of the jury is linked to the larger democratic function of the jury as
a space for direct citizen lawmaking and interpretation.

CRIM. L. 175, 212 (2003) (noting that jurors chosen for race will undermine the legitimacy of potential
verdicts by suggesting a predictive voting pattern); Andrew Kull, Racial Justice: Trial by Cross
Section, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 17, 20 ("[A] person can neither represent another's interests

effectively nor judge him fairly unless he is of the same race."); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race
Discriminationin Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 733 (1992) ("A
race-based generalization about the likely views of jurors cannot lawfully be the basis for any legal

rule.").
85. In fact, jurors, through a deliberative process may abandon their idiosyncrasies in ways that
do not occur in the electoral process. See KENNEDY, supra note 84, at 252. They may also weigh
competing allegiances and aspects of their rich and multi-faceted identities when asked to contextualize

in an individual case or defendant. See Carroll, Nullification as Law, supra note 2, at 627. Certainly
jurors may deliberate and vote recklessly, refusing to abandon a belief or bias, but the public's faith in
the institution rests in part on a belief that this is a rare occurrence-that in fact, jurors, like voters, take
their roles seriously and that there is a virtue in their ability to bridge the formal law and the common
experience. See id. at 586; Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77

VA. L. REv. 1413, 1485-86 (1991) (suggesting that the jury deliberation process enforces public faith in
verdicts because it encourages citizen jurors to vote on the "public interest, rather than their self-

interest").
86. The Court has recognized this risk over and over again. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
914 (1995) (warning that equal protection jurisprudence "forbids" reliance on stereotypes); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-48 (1993) (expressing concern that racial stereotypes were furthered by the
belief that members of particular racial groups "think alike" and will bring a singular perspective to a

case); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (1986) (prohibiting "action based on crude, inaccurate
racial stereotypes").
87. I hesitate in this for two reasons. First, there are unique aspects to the jury's deliberative
process, as will be discussed further in Part 1II, that may occur regardless of whether the juror enters the
deliberation room believing he is an "interest-based" voter. Second, there may be times when jurors do

in fact nullify as a commentary on a law as a whole, as opposed to merely as applied to a particular
defendant, and this act may further the bridge function of jurors. See Darryl K. Brown, Jury

Nullification Within the Rule ofLaw, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1156-58 (1997).
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The Concept of an EnfranchisingJury in a Fair-Cross-Sectionand
EqualProtectionAnalysis

There are other possible functions for the jury. Given the significant
challenges of both achieving a representative jury and reconciling a theory
of representation with the Court's fair-cross-section and equal protection
analysis, it is helpful to consider an alternative possibility: Perhaps the jury
serves an enfranchising role in addition to or perhaps in lieu of its
representative role. Under this conception of the jury, as with other
electoral processes, legitimacy swings on the citizen's opportunity to
exercise the right, as opposed to the actual exercise of the right.8 In the
context of juries, allegiance to an enfranchisement model would suggest it
matters less that a descriptively representative juror actually served on any
given jury than that they had a fair opportunity to be called to serve. Placed
in the rubric of the Founders' vision of the jury as a body uniquely able to
monitor the application of formally created and applied law, this
opportunity to have a voice might well be sufficient, even if did not
necessarily create an opportunity for that voice to surface on every jury. 89
An enfranchisement vision of the jury neatly avoids the conflict
between the fair-cross-section doctrine and the Court's sense that diversity
among serving jurors provides valuable perspective. If one views the jury's
function as to enfranchise the community, then inclusion in any particular
petit jury and the competence such inclusion brings matters less. In fact, the
absence of any particularity in selection may insulate the jury against
claims of undue influence. The resulting jury is independent and therefore
capable of achieving a larger democratic function that includes checking
the power of government or rethinking the construct of law, regardless of
whether it is a descriptively representative jury. 90 Individual juror
competence, however defined, is simply less important, supplanted by
group competence and the faith that with an equal opportunity for all to
participate, one juror is as qualified as the next.9 1 Likewise, under an
enfranchisement model, micro-jurisdictional differences matter less. Like
88. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187,
195 (1946); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223, 225 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
85 (1942), supersededby statute, FED. R. EVID. 104(a), as recognized in Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171 (1987); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
89. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 94-96, 100; JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 293 (1996); Vikram David

Amar, supra note 9, at 253-54; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (describing
jury service as a unique opportunity for "community participation").

90. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1990).
91. See Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220 ("Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class
matter."); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220).

2015]

The Jury as Democracy

849

any local electoral process, there is an expectation of differences among
different communities.
Adopting an enfranchisement model, however, fails to account for key
differences between the jury system and the electoral system. These
differences render the enfranchisement model unlikely to produce the
desired faith in the system if the "opportunity" to serve never translates into
actual service. On a most basic level, elections are public events. Voters
know well in advance when an election is, what or who is on the ballots,
whether they are eligible to vote, and when it is all over, what the result of
the election is. Once a ballot is cast, each vote counts equally, which means
in theory that each voter has an equal opportunity to see her particular
position put into effect. Even with some spectacular recent failures, the
electoral system is a model of transparency and efficiency in comparison to
the opacity of the jury selection process.
In contrast, a jury summons arrives almost magically, unexpectedly, in
the mail on a schedule seemingly entirely its own. Not everyone who is
eligible to serve as a juror is summoned at the same time, and even among
those summoned most turn out to not be needed. 92 Summoned jurors may
also serve different purposes than one another. Unlike their electoral
brethren who know what they will be voting on in advance (we hope),
jurors may be assigned a role as civil or criminal jurors randomly. The end
result is that disenfranchisement may be harder to detect among jurors than
it is among voters. 93 This can undermine community faith in the jury
system itself, which may explain the fair-cross-section doctrine's
requirement that exclusion be demonstrated over time-as well as its grant
of third-party standing to protect a juror's interests.94 Without either
provision, it might be impossible to detect when particular groups were
excluded from the opportunity to participate or to raise a claim surrounding
this exclusion. Third-party standing provisions are also consistent with
juries serving a larger democratic function. While the defendant does have
a particular interest in a jury of his peers, the interest is not his alone. 95 It is
also ours, as a community. Defendants therefore litigate not only on their
own behalf, but on behalf of all of us when they raise fair-cross-section
challenges.
92. Certainly high plea bargain rates render many jurors unnecessary and even create a question
about the utility of juries generally. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1911-12 (1992); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal
Law's DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2548 (2004).
93. See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 398 (1998); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320,
329-30 (1970).
94. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).
95. See Laura 1. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 398
(2009).
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Another key difference between jury selection and voting is the
existence of peremptory strikes. Peremptory strikes allow parties to remove
jurors for no articulated reason, or in some cases, for the most cursory (and
possibly illusory) of articulated reasons. 96 Historically, peremptory strikes
have been used disproportionally to exclude cognizable groups. The use of
peremptory strikes, therefore, arguably makes the selection process less
random, less fair, and more partial. I cannot quarrel with this critique, but I
do think it is incomplete. Peremptory strikes are frequently the only method
to vindicate a defendant's perspective and to ensure him some control over
the selection of the jury that will determine his culpability. But like the
right to a jury itself, this benefit is not exclusively the defendant's. The
presence of the peremptory strike can also vindicate the public's interests
by removing any feared biases that may not rise to the level of a for-cause
strike.
Beyond these apparent imperfections in the analogy between the
electoral and jury processes, the enfranchisement account of jury service is
problematic on other levels. Both the fair-cross-section and equal
protection jurisprudence define limited populations as eligible for remedies
if disenfranchised. These populations share the immutable traits of race and
gender. Exclusion from jury service based on transient characteristics or
characteristics that may be less readily identifiable cannot be remedied
under either doctrine, despite the Court's caution that it should avoid
stereotypes based on immutable traits. The Court has justified limiting
challenges to exclusions based on immutable traits both in terms of
descriptive representation and in the practical terms of how to demonstrate
the exclusion itself.9 7 The immutable trait allows the community not only to
recognize itself, or some variant of itself, on the jury, but also to recognize
when particular groups have been excluded for improper reasons. The very
permanency and clarity of the trait serves as a tell for the state of mind of
the actor who excluded individuals possessing this trait.
The difficulty with this explanation is that it seems to be premised on a
notion of identity that the Court itself recognizes as dangerous. As
discussed above, identities, even of those who possess permanent and
immutable traits, are not themselves permanent or singular. Any given
person simultaneously embodies different perspectives and allegiances.
Some-like race or gender-are fixed (or relatively fixed); others-like
political allegiance or social class-are not. Just as descriptive
representation cannot guarantee substantive representation, so the presence
of an immutable trait can serve only as a weak proxy to inform the
96.
97.

See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
Id. at 122.
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community of whether every eligible member has had an opportunity to
participate. This creates an odd quandary for proponents of the
enfranchisement model. If faith in the model rests on a sense that all
members of an eligible population have had an equal opportunity to
participate, then defining exclusion from that opportunity becomes critical.
With only narrow categories of exclusion eligible to raise claims, the
population may lose faith in the system's ability to recognize, much less
remedy, their own exclusion.
A final key difference between electoral processes and the jury system
lies in the character of the jury's decision-making process. The significance
of this difference will be explored further in Part III, but unlike voters,
jurors come to their decisions in the presence of one another. Their verdicts
are the process of face-to-face deliberations. While this may be a doubleedged sword in any discussion about composition, at a minimum it renders
the jury system distinct from its electoral counterpart. As with the
discussion of the representative function of the jury, embedded in the
conversation about the enfranchisement model is a sense of the jury's
larger democratic function. The opportunity to serve on a jury matters
because juries serve as opportunities for governance and law creation.
While the Court has not explicitly addressed this larger democratic function
in its jury selection jurisprudence, thinking about jury composition requires
an acknowledgment of this function, however you define it.
III. THE WILD CARD OF DELIBERATION
With competing and conjoining theories of the jury in place, the
importance of jury composition emerges, and yet the discussion is still
incomplete because it fails to account for a critical and unique component
of the jury process-deliberation itself. As jurors struggle to determine the
defendant's culpability, they do so in one another's presence. In theory, this
process should spark not only debates among the citizen jurors, but also a
reasoned exchange of ideas and perspectives that furthers democratic
process.9 8 The verdict that results from deliberation is thereby rendered

98. Within the larger democracy, deliberation is extolled as a means to not only inform the
citizenry but to ensure that they make good choices. See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF
REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY & AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 1-2, 6-39 (1994)

(arguing that the Founders envisioned a deliberative democracy, even if only one that was deliberative
through representation); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT

(1996) (examining deliberative democracy and proposing possible expansions of its scope); JORGEN
&

HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW

DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992) (describing how deliberation furthers
democratic institutions by encouraging the exchange of ideas). James Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman
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legitimate not only by way of the composition of the jury that reached it,
but also by way of the process by which it was reached. 99 In short,
deliberation among jurors should produce a wiser, more righteous outcome
than a conclusion reached by the individual alone. But this notion is far
from settled. In fact, studies of deliberating groups conclude that they are
just as likely, and possibly more likely, to censor minority voices and force
uniformity, even toward a demonstratively false result. 00 Deliberations
plagued by internal informational influences and social pressures may drive
groups to error, even if information available to those involved in the
deliberation would have produced "correct" results.' 0
A. A Caveat: What Do Juries Decide?
These studies are worth examining as we think about a larger
democratic function for juries. But they are also difficult to apply whole
cloth to jury deliberation, as they tend to focus on group determination of a
factual issue or issues.1 0 2 In other words, they revolve around a universe in
which there is a known right and wrong that can be tested and ascertained.
But jury verdicts are more complex. Even if we narrow our focus to
verdicts that seek to determine the presence or absence of a factual
occurrence, a true right or true wrong answer may be difficult to locate.
Jurors hear evidence and arguments in an adversarial forum in which
competing witnesses may describe a single event with varying perspective,
detail, and accuracy. Even objective facts invite subjective overlay. A
woman may in fact be dead. Her husband may in fact have struck the fatal
have argued that there ought to be a national holiday devoted to deliberation as a means of promoting a
democratic ideal. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 3-16 (2004).
99. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 115-24 (1990) (examining the educative

effect of deliberation and the likelihood the deliberating parties will acquiesce to what they perceive to
be legitimate decisions).
100. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 6-10 (2d ed., rev. 1983) (arguing that groups tend to
promote consensus over accuracy in decision making); Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, ProperAnalysis
of the Accuracy of Group Judgments, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149 (1997); Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing
Micro and Macro Rationality, in JUDGMENTS, DECISIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 116, 120-26 (Rajeev
Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox eds., 2002) (explaining that many factors can cause groups to reach less
accurate results than individuals acting alone); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: StatisticalMeans,
Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 965 (2005) (noting that "[w]ithout
structural protections, ... groups may well err, not in spite of deliberation but because of it").
101. See Sunstein, supra note 100, at 966.
102. A prime example is the Condorcet Jury Theory, which takes as a starting point that people
are answering a question that has two possible answers-true or false-and that there is in fact a correct
answer to the query. See William P. Bottom et al., Propagationof Individual Bias Through Group
Judgment: Error in the Treatment of Asymmetrically Informative Signals, 25 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY,
Sept. 2002, at 147, 151-54. The theory goes on to argue that assuming that the average probability of
each juror answering correctly exceeds 50% then the probability of arriving at a correct answer to any
question by majority increases towards certainty as the group's size increases. Id. at 153.

2015]

The Jury as Democracy

853

blow. These facts may be admitted and acknowledged by all, but the
ultimate question of the husband's guilt may remain elusive. Did the
husband act in self-defense, a fit of rage, or in the midst of psychotic
break? Did he misunderstand the consequences of his actions or to whom
he administered the deathblow? Did he act as anyone else in his position
would have, or was he "unreasonable" with all the subjective calculations
such an assessment curtails? Was he drunk or simple or cunning or sad or
betrayed or devious or justified? If he was all or any of these things, can he
now fashion an excuse that his fellow citizens, sitting as jurors, can weigh
against the death of his wife to conclude that he is not legally guilty, not
sufficiently culpable to warrant punishment?
If the jury's task is further complicated by a conscious or unconscious
acknowledgement that they are judging not just these "factual" questions
but also what they mean to the larger community, is it possible to ascertain
a "right" verdict? It may be that we can "agree" as a community that the
husband killed his wife and that killing is wrong and killers culpable; but
we may also agree that we would be disquieted by his conviction, either
because we do not believe the law should apply to him or we do not agree
that the law prohibiting his behavior should exist at all. In short, defining a
"right" or factually accurate verdict may be complex.
At the end of the day, there may be some value in this struggle amongst
the citizenry to layer legal and factual analysis as they deliberate towards a
verdict. It may also suggest that the best we can hope for from a jury is an
approximation of our sense of what should constitute guilt in any given
case. In moments when dissent from formally constructed norms embodied
in the law surfaces, juries, in their deliberations, can offer a correction.
Whether identified as nullification or a failure of proof of pure facts beyond
a reasonable doubt, juries are in a unique position to insert a competing
notion of a "right" result into their verdict. To these juries a strict
application of the law, or even the law itself, may produce what appears to
their own senses to be a "wrong" result. In weighing the possibilities of this
unique and larger democratic function of the jury, examination of juror
composition is insufficient. It is also necessary to examine deliberation and
the complexities of the jury's decision-making process.
B. What We Were Thinking When We All Got Together
Unlike other electoral processes, juries reach their verdicts through a
deliberative process that depends on interactions between and among
deciding parties. The common belief has been that such interaction would
result not only in consensus (when possible), but also an informed and
accurate decision-making process. Closer examination suggests that this
may not in fact occur. While those deliberating may be more confident in
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their decisions after deliberation, this confidence does not necessarily
correlate with accuracy.103
Several pitfalls await deliberating decision makers. The presence of a
systematic bias will sway individual answers. 10 4 The fact that deliberation
would require the presentation of this bias to the group does not, it turns
out, insulate against the effect of such biases on the group's ultimate
judgment. 05 In circumstances where error and confusion are widespread,
individual answers and group decisions tend to be worse than random
6
answers, even when considering questions that exceed binary choices.10
Certainly many of these group errors can be avoided by employing experts
to make decisions in their area of expertise, 10 7 but the use of experts may
actually serve to undo some of the benefits of jury decisions by undoing
juror independence and disrupting their common status. In other words,
what we gain by employing experts to produce "accurate" verdicts, we lose
in democratic function by resigning our decision-making authority to yet
one more formal or non-common actor.
We might hope that forcing decision makers to consult with one
another and deliberate toward a shared conclusion would both drive them
away from biases and encourage them to reject patently improper
anchors.108 But this premise rests on assumptions that have proven difficult
to realize consistently in the context of group decision-making. First, group
deliberations generally drive toward a lowest common denominator. 109 Put
another way, they tend to reduce variance and encourage conformity.
Second, the group's interaction tends to increase confidence, but not
necessarily accuracy.110 So a group, after deliberating, may enjoy a false
sense of security that the decision reached by consensus is accurate
regardless of whether that sense is grounded in any sort of reality.1 11 As a
103. See Chip Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction with Others IncreasesDecision Confidence
but Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views of Interactive Decision
Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 305, 306 (1995).
104. See Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporatingthe Irrelevant: Anchors in
Judgments of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE

JUDGMENT 120, 120-22 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (noting the effect of false anchors, even
arbitrary or clearly incorrect anchors, on individual decisions).

105.
106.

See Sunstein, supranote 100, at 975.
Id. at 976 (describing a study conducted at the University of Chicago Law School).

See J. Scott Armstrong, Combining Forecasts, in PRINCIPLES OF FORECASTING: A
107.
HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCHERS AND PRACTITIONERS 417, 419-33 (J. Scott Armstrong ed., 2001)
(describing numerous studies in which experts exhibited a high degree of accuracy in judgments in their

particular fields or closely related fields).
108. See Sunstein, supranote 100, at 980.
109.

See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 206-07 (1986).

110.

See Heath & Gonzalez, supra note 103, at 306.

Ill.

See RUPERT BROWN, GROUP PROCESSES: DYNAMICS WITHIN AND BETWEEN GROUPS 175-

77 (2d ed. 2000).
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result, members of the deliberating group may identify their decision as
legitimate regardless of its accuracy.
Part of the problem seems to stem from the fact that those deliberating
often do not share information; thus the group's decision does not represent
its collective wisdom, but rather the wisdom to which the group agreed to
defer.11 2 This wisdom is not necessarily the wisdom that is either correct or
consistent with more "broadly shared normative framework[s]," but rather
is the wisdom that is able to garner "at least some initial social support."" 3
In short, groups tend to converge on "truths" under two conditions: first,
when the position garners support early in the deliberative process; and
second, when the question before the group is one which has a
demonstrably accurate answer or an answer that resonates with the
group.' 14 Perhaps most discouraging from the perspective of jury
deliberation, group deliberation tends to discourage novelty and force
conformity, even around less desirable outcomes." 5 In the context of the
jury, all this suggests that 12 Angry Men is nothing more than an
aspirational tale; the lone hold-out, even if correct and passionate in his
beliefs, will not sway his fellow jurors.1 6 At best, he can hope to hang the
jury. In real life, when the majority of participants in the group process are
wrong, the group tends to be wrong as well.' Groups "do[] not use
information efficiently," and group deliberation provides little of the
expected protection against erroneous conclusions. 18
In considering why group deliberations tend not to live up to their
promise, Cass Sunstein suggest two possibilities: informational influences

112. See id. at 170-93 (noting that group performance is complex and has mixed results in terms
of accuracy); Gigone & Hastie, supra note 100, at 149-53 (finding that group judgments tend to be as
accurate as the mean judgments of their members, though less accurate than the conclusions of their
most accurate voters); Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups,
103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 713 (1996) (concluding there is "no simple empirical answer" as to whether
groups make more or less biased judgments than individuals).
113. MacCoun, supra note 100, at 120.

114.

Id.

115.

See BROWN, supra note 111, at 176 (noting that brainstorming exercises in a group context

tend to discourage novelty and therefore concluding that "brainstorming is actually most beneficial
when carried out initially in private, the interacting group then being used as a forum for combining and

evaluating these individually produced ideas").
116. In Reginald Rose's film, Henry Fonda plays a lone juror who convinces his fellow jurors
that there is reason to doubt the evidence presented in a case against an eighteen-year-old accused of
stabbing his father to death. Fonda, passionate in his belief that witnesses have testified inaccurately
against the defendant, is able in the end to persuade his fellow jurors to acquit the eighteen-year-old.

See 12 ANGRY MEN (MGM Studios, Inc. 1957).
117.

See MacCoun, supra note 100, at 124 (demonstrating that group interaction amplifies

individual bias).
118. Armstrong, supra note 107, at 433 (concluding that combining individual knowledge in the
context of group deliberation does not produce more accurate results).
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and social pressures.l1 9 The first possibility, informational influences, holds
that particular group members are likely to defer their own beliefs if they
diverge from the apparent beliefs of the majority-the stronger the
apparent belief of the group, the more likely the deferral.1 2 0 So if a juror
finds her belief system to be in the minority, and particularly if she is the
sole dissenter, she is unlikely to challenge the group's conclusions even if
in the process she ignores evidence that contradicts such conclusions. 121fa
member of a group presents as an "authority" on a particular subject, other
group members will defer to the identified authority, even if the authority's
position contradicts any given member's own conclusions.1 22 While an
advantage of the deliberative process is that it is designed to encourage
members to voice reasons for their conclusions, 12 3 these reasons-once
voiced-may have a silencing effect on conclusions or reasoning that
contradict them.1 24
Information influences are further complicated by information
cascades. Such cascades affect group decision makers, including jurors, by
producing a tendency to follow positions that are articulated early and with
confidence, even if such opinions are both contrary to their own opinion
and are in fact incorrect.' 25 This cascade has a cumulative effect: the more
members align with a particular view, the more it appears that the view
reflects a strongly held majority position. Accordingly, jurors may be
driven to an improper verdict by the early articulation of a particular
position with confidence.1 2 6 In addition, jurors may fail to disclose

119.

See Sunstein, supra note 100, at 984-86.

120. See DAVID KRECH ET AL., INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 510-14 (1962) (individuals are highly
susceptible to majority influences).
121. See KRECH ET AL., supra note 120; Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in
READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 13 (Elliott Aronson ed., 7th ed. 1995).
122. See KRECH ET AL., supranote 120.
123. See HABERMAS, supra note 98, at 340-41 (stating that the deliberative ideal is premised on
the conclusions based on reasons given by group members).
124. See Sunstein, supra note 100, at 985 ("The problem is that when reasons are given, group
members are likely to pay attention to them in a way that can lead such members to fail to say what they
know.").
125. See Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM.

ECON. REV. 847, 859 (1997) (noting that "initial misrepresentative signals start a chain of incorrect
decisions that is not broken by more representative signals received later").
126.
See Fabio Lorenzi-Cioldi & Alain Climence, Group Processes and the Construction of
Social Representations, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES 31,

49-50 (Micahel A. Hogg & R. Scott Tindale eds., 2001); David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the
Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN

BEHAVIOR 188, 193-95 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn lerulli eds., 1995). Unfortunately none of the
studies provide information regarding which sorts of actors are likely to present their viewpoints first
and thus capitalize on the cascade effect, but read in the context of studies regarding confidence of
opinion, one might expect members of the majority to do so.
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information that might be helpful to other members of the group in
response to the cascade effect.1 2 7
Beyond information influences, social influences affect group decisionmaking. Social influences control because people fear being subjected to
social sanctions and derision for expressing opinions that deviate from the
group's emerging position.1 2 8 In the context of deliberation, social
influences can result in self-censorship and silence when a party believes
that his position will be disliked or even just different.1 29 This silencing
effect is not anchored to the accuracy of the belief,1 3 0 but is driven by the
probability that the belief contradicts a dominant position in the group and,
therefore, will be subject to scrutiny and ultimately disapproval.' 3 ' These
social pressures can be intense, particularly if a group is cohesive and
charged with reaching consensus.132
The result of such social pressures is suboptimal decision-making
conditions. Divergent opinions either will not surface at all or, if they do,
will be presented with reluctance-increasing the likelihood that they will
be discounted by the group. 33 For members of traditional minority groups,
or those with a lower social status-including people of color, women, and
those less educated-this fear of social ostracization or rebuke is more
pronounced and carries with it echoes of historical and existing power
dynamics. 134 As a result, members of these groups tend to speak less and to
carry less influence when deliberating in groups dominated by those with
higher social status.1 3 5 In practical terms this means that the mere presence

127.
128.
129.

See Anderson & Holt, supranote 125.
Sunstein, supra note 100, at 986.
See Glenn C. Loury, Self-Censorship in Public Discourse: A Theory of "Political

Correctness" and Related Phenomena, 6 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 428, 430 (1994).
130.
See Robert L. Thomdike, The Effect of Discussion upon the Correctness of Group
Decisions, When the Factor of Majority Influence is Allowed for, 9 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 343, 345, 355

(1938) (noting that majority pressures will influence individual decisions even when there is a "clearly
right" answer that the individual knows to be correct but different than the majority's position).

131.

Loury,supra note 129, at 430-31.

132. See Jos6 M. Marques et al., Social Categorization, Social Identification, and Rejection of
Deviant Group Members, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES

400,403 (Michael A. Hogg & R. Scott Tindale eds., 2001).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135.

See Jacob K. Goeree & Leeat Yariv, An Experimental Study ofJury Deliberation (Institute

for Empirical Research in Economics, Working Paper No. 438, 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1476567; Garold Stasser & William Titus, Hidden Profiles: A BriefHistory, 14
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 304, 308 (2003) (noting that individuals who tend to be in minority positions in
larger communities tend to conceal or silence their perspective in the context of group deliberations,
particularly in the face of a strong presentation by someone occupying a majority position in the larger
community). Stasser and Titus found this to be true even when low status members possessed unique
information that was relevant to the decision at hand. Id. Stasser and Titus went on to note that group
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of diversity on a jury may not increase perspective as the Court hoped.
Rather, it may only replicate the perspective available in the larger
community, at least as to the ultimate question of guilt." 6
In a related vein, members of a decision-making group may seek to
conform their opinions to what they perceive as the opinion of the larger
group.' 3 7 This creates a reputational cascade. Even if the individual
member disagrees with the position of the group, he may doubt and
ultimately conform his position rather than challenge that of the group. 138
This may occur even in a space such as a jury room where deliberation is
an articulated and anticipated part of the process.1 3 9 The end result may be
a polarization of the group's position. 140 Studies indicate that the risk of
polarization is especially high if a group member perceives himself as
possessing a shared identity with other members of the group and links that
identity to a particular position. 14 1
All this suggests that the biases or errors of a group's individual
members may actually be amplified in the context of group decisionmaking processes, particularly if the bias is widely shared.1 4 2 But even this
is a double-edged sword. Biases that are not widely shared tend to be
corrected by group deliberation.143 These tendencies are also more
pronounced in circumstances where interdependent decisions are being
made and there is no clear "right" or "wrong" answer.1 44 Finally, the

members tended to overestimate the accuracy of high status members of groups and underestimate that
of low status (or minority) members. Id.
136. See Baldus et al., supra note 64, at 124 (reaching the same conclusion); Kotch & Mosteller,
supra note 64, at 2127 (concluding that minority presence on juries may affect sentencing decisions in

capital cases).
137. See Sunstein, supra note 100, at 1001-02 (describing experiments tracking reputational
cascade).

138.
139.

Id.
Id.

140. See BROWN, supra note 111, at 209.
141. See id. at 210 (noting that polarization is most likely when members have a shared identity
and perceive a position as linked to that identity).

142. See Garold Stasser & Beth Dietz-Uhler, Collective Choice, Judgment, and Problem Solving,
in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES 31, 49-50 (Micahel A. Hogg

& R. Scott Tindale eds., 2001); MacCoun, supra note 100, at 121-26 (showing amplification of widely
shared biases by juries).

143.

See MacCoun, supra note 100, at 121-26 (suggesting that biases that do not share widely

held support tend to be silenced or corrected in the context of jury deliberations); see also Sunstein,
supra note 100, at 993 (proposing that one benefit of social influence in the context of group
deliberation is that individual members with egocentric biases may correct them in the face of a group

judgment that the belief is not widely shared).
144.

See BROWN, supra note 109, at 222-26 (concluding that when asked to answer questions

involving morality or normative issues, group discussions produced increasing polarization among
members even beyond their pre-deliberation tendencies); see also Kerr et al., supra note 112, at 714

(suggesting that biases, informational

influences, and social pressures are amplified in group
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presence of a genuine dissenting perspective can enhance group
performance by forcing members of the group to question their own biases
and information sources. 14 5
C.

Why This Mattersfor Juries

This research offers several possible insights for jury selection
jurisprudence. On the one hand, the Court's intuition that composition
matters is right, both for the reasons the Court has articulated and for
another critical reason. Beyond the fact that composition may well increase
the external sense that a verdict reached by the jury is a "legitimate" one,
the composition of the jury may offer the opportunity for a genuine dissent
that may well inject a varied perspective into the deliberative process. This
in turn may push jurors to engage in the type of reasoned discussion that
the deliberative ideal promises.
But composition, and specifically composition measured over time,
may matter for another reason as well. To the extent that research into
deliberation suggests that group decision-making processes may stifle,
rather than promote, minority voices, the presence of a fair cross section on
any given jury would not provide the genuine dissent that pushes jurors to
reconsider their position. In order for this to occur, the minority presence
would need to be stronger, a near or actual majority presence. This suggests
that our consideration of jury composition with an eye toward a larger
democratic function is not sufficient. A still more nuanced examination is
required-one that overlays what we know about the constitutional
requirements of diversity and deliberative group dynamics.

IV. RETHINKING JURY SELECTION
Much of the literature on jury selection focuses on the need to increase
diversity on individual juries-to render any given jury's composition
reflective or nearly reflective of the community from which it is drawn.146
deliberation settings in which "real-world decision tasks" are required that tend to lack certainty and
listing, among other examples, jury deliberations).
145. See Alexander L. George & Erik K. Stem, Harnessing Conflict in Foreign Policy Making:
From Devil's to Multiple Advocacy, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STuD. Q. 484, 486-87 (2002) (finding that the
presence of a "staged" devil's advocate did not benefit group decision-making processes, but the
presence of genuine dissent did, even in the face of its status as a minority). So maybe Henry Fonda was
right after all. See supranotes 115-116 and accompanying text.
146. This description of diversity is not unique to discussions about juries, though it certainly
pertains to them. Discussions of diversity in the modem literature take on a fidelity to proportional
representation. See SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 24 (2003); HANNA FENICHEL
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91 (1967) (describing diversity as an integration of
populations on decision-making bodies to reflect the community's population). In order to be diverse,
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The theory is that if juries are to serve a larger democratic function, then
they need to reflect the community's makeup. Their failure to do so
jeopardizes their function and, in the long run, raises questions about the
legitimacy of the process and the value of the verdict produced.
But the proposition is tricky. There is no question that all portions of
the population must have an opportunity to serve on juries. That is the
ground the Supreme Court has carved out in the debate, and the proposition
seems uncontested and uncontestable. This proposition, however, is
decidedly different than requiring or ensuring proportionality on any single
jury. In fact, non-proportional representation may better facilitate the jury's
function as an alternative source of law within the democracy. First, nonproportional representation may open a space in the deliberative process for
previously excluded or suppressed perspectives to present. This brings a
distinct value if we view jurors as more responsive democratic actors. But
beyond this, jettisoning allegiances to proportional representation on petit
juries may allow for a more nuanced consideration of representation--one
that recognizes that while a representative jury matters, the question of
what that representation is and precisely why it matters shifts as notions of
function shift.
If one of the underlying values of the jury is that it can play a critical
interpretive role within the democratic lawmaking body, then one must first
confront the question of precisely which community the jury seeks to
represent. In a world in which different communities may bear the
disproportional burden of lawmaking and application, different
communities may have a different stake in the jury itself. As a result, using
geographically defined jurisdictions to produce venire panels may cease to
make sense. The shifting nature of identity and the complexity of the
question that jurors ultimately consider further complicates the inquiry and
counsels towards a new conception of jury composition.
A. Second Order Diversity and the Jury
While adopting a proportional representation requirement on petit
juries would create descriptive representation, it may also be
counterproductive to the democratic function of the jury. Proportional
representation renders the jury system akin to other electoral processes,
with corresponding minority and majority viewpoints. Coupled with what
we know about deliberative process, requiring proportionality on any given

the composition of any decision-making body must mirror that of the relevant population in questionwhether it be the city, county, state, or nation. See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING
GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 22-23 (2003).
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jury may only serve to reinforce existing perspectives. Minority or
divergent views would be unlikely to present. While this might shore up the
macro-jurisdiction's sense that the verdict produced in any given
jurisdiction was legitimate and would certainly promote continuity in the
vision of the law, it prompts the question of what is the remaining function
of the jury, and is it at all distinct from other electoral functions?
In contrast, allowing variance among decision-making bodies will be
more likely to produce divergent outcomes. Proponents of this second order
diversity recognize that there may be affirmative benefits from nonproportional representation on non-aggregate decision-making bodies such
as the jury.1 4 7 In a nutshell, proponents of second order diversity argue that
homogeneity on the jury is not the problem, but rather the problem is the
failure to empanel-at least sometimes-minority homogenous juries or
near minority homogenous juries.1 4 8 These minority dominated juries open
a space in the political conversation for those ordinarily relegated to the
margins by giving a meaningful opportunity for voice, even in the small
realm of the jury room and the verdict form.
Beyond this, depriving the majority of its status, even in a small forum
like a jury, alters its own perceptions of power and place in a community.
Minority populations are not only vested for once with the power to decide,
but majority populations are, for brief moments, divested of that power.
This serves an educative function for both sides, forcing each to recognize
the position normally occupied by the other and offering windows for
shifting identities and allegiances. When traditional power dynamics are
collapsed, even if only in the context of a single moment of deliberation, a
corridor is opened to reconsider and redefine one's identity within the
larger community and democracy. In the process, a more nuanced and
empathetic political identity may emerge.
Allowing for variance among juries also allows for substantively
different outcomes than would occur in other electoral processes. As
electoral institutions grow larger and larger, this matters more. The
electoral process tends to drive decisions toward a lowest common
denominator, much as group think dynamics do.1 49 Participants
compromise their positions again and again, abandoning parts of their own
belief systems along the way. In national or even statewide elections, voters
tend to express with dismay the absence of any candidate that reflects their
own particular interests or perspective. Faced with less than optimal or
147.

See Gerken, supra note 5, at 1104.

148.
149.

See id.
See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, One Inspiring Jury, 101 MICH. -L. REV. 1387, 1396 (2003)

(reviewing REGINALD ROSE, TWELVE ANGRY MEN (1955)); Gerken, supra note 5, at 1125; Sunstein,
supra note 100.

Alabama Law Review

862

[Vol. 66:4825

reflective choices, voters either opt out (by not voting) or vote for someone
who is the best of all available options. In this world minority perspectives
rarely surface, buried beneath an avalanche of majority rule and
accompanying compromise. If juries are forced to mirror populations
precisely in their composition, we should expect roughly, if not precisely,
the same results that we would see in any other voting process. But when
the proportionality requirement is shed, the possibility of previously
marginalized (and ghettoized) results emerges. While such results
admittedly may not represent the values of every member of the
community, they may represent the values of some members of the
community more precisely than results from other formalized power
processes. Beyond this, they may force a recognition of a perspective
previously excluded. No single theory or identity is allowed to dominate. In
the words of Heather Gerken, we cycle and, in the process, "vary our
strategies for dealing with group conflict." 50
A further conversation about diversity and identity is embedded in this
discussion. While diversity seems to be the linchpin to any discussion
about the jury's democratic function, defining what is meant by this term,
or why it matters, is not. Among different populations, diversity can mean
different things, and the sufficiency of integration can be a moving target
depending on the object of the integration and which population is asked to
judge its sufficiency.'"' Scholars define diversity in terms of a statistical
integration evidenced by a representation proportional to the population,1 52
though even they vary on which aspects of the identity must be
proportionally matched. Regardless of its precise definition, that the ideal
of proportional diversity does not occur in the real world, and that decision
makers frequently fail to achieve this standard (or even anything close to
it), does not seem to alter it as a touchstone. Nor does the practical failure
to realize proportional diversity in other contexts sway the pervasive belief
that diversity achieves some benefit otherwise unobtainable (although there
may be considerable debate about what exactly that benefit is or how
diversity makes it happen).
On at least one level, this may be tolerable. The notion of diversity
hints at a fixed status of majority and minority identity. In fact, in most
contexts, such categories tend to be far more porous or elastic. Identity,

150.
151.

See Gerken, supra note 5, at 1104.
See SCHUCK, supranote 146, at 19; Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights

at the Turn ofa Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291, 318 (1997) (noting that minority populations tend to
think of diversity in different terms than majority populations).
152. See SCHUCK, supra note 146, at 22-23.
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after all, is complex and multidimensional.1 53 The very characteristics that
may render any given individual a member of a majority in one context
may render the same individual part of a minority in another context.
Democratic processes should both acknowledge and benefit from these
shifting statuses. As different group decision-making opportunities emerge,
the possibility of a near constant minority status encourages empathetic
behavior and multidimensional assessment of policy and resolution of
conflict. But on some fundamental level, and even in the face of shifting
identities, it is still possible that some portion of the population will occupy
a space designated as an electoral minority.
This embedded reality of a constant and semi-fixed minority creates a
challenge within our democracy where we value majority rule and cling to
a faith that the will of the majority benefits the whole. 15 4 This creates a
fixed power dynamic where minorities may enjoy influence, but not
decision-making power.15 5 While members of a minority population may
be able, through coalition building, to exercise that influence to affect
policy, reliance on majority rule precludes the possibility that the minority
will ever have an opportunity to make decisions that truly reflect their
ideals.1 5 6 On the one hand, perhaps this is the same process of compromise
we all engage in and accept as part of the representative democracy. 57 But
for those who reside in the fixed minority classification, their ability to
insert their perspective in the process of compromise may be minimal or
non-existent. While none of us may get everything we want in any given
policy, some of us may get less and some of us may never be heard at all.
A second order diversity analysis, therefore, suggests that in the
context of juries there may be some benefits to thinking. of diversity across
petit juries, rather than within petit juries. Abandoning an allegiance to
proportionally representative petit juries creates a space for electoral
minorities to sometimes seize power and control the definition of the law at
a critical moment when the law is applied to a defendant whose narrative
especially resonates even in the face of the government's counter-narrative.
It offers a rare opportunity for power dynamics to be redefined and, in the
process, the law itself modified to accommodate other voices and lives.
153.
See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 20-32 (1971);
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 133 (1956) (describing communities as
governed by near constant minority rule).
154. See Michael J. Klarman, MajoritarianJudicialReview: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 525 (1997).
155.
See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 5, 65-66 (1994) (noting the profound reluctance of majority
populations to share power with minority groups).
156.

See Gerken, supra note 5, at 1124-25.

157.

See id. at 1125.
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Suddenly, different values are cast as middle ground, and previously
excluded factions have the opportunity to edit the law they could not create
in other more formal and majoritarian-driven contexts.
In this, juries
realize a democratic function of allowing previously unrepresented
perspectives to present, even if just in a limited forum, and even if they are
merely the product of reconfigured identity allegiances in light of the
defendant's narrative.
As attractive as the prospect of second order diversity is as a means to
empower minority perspectives, it is not without its drawbacks.
Encouraging heterogeneity among juries jettisons an individual rights
analysis in favor of a global or systematic benefit.' 59 Defendants relinquish
a claim to a jury that accurately reflects the community from which it is
drawn. The community itself accepts shifting norms in this limited
decision-making realm-with concepts of majority and minority shifting
with each new empanelment. Whatever promise of newly realized power
this vision of heterogeneity offers, it relegates its rulers to the smallest of
empires with a limited grant of authority over a single case, a single
verdict-with the only hope for more expansive power coming in the form
of aggregation among verdicts. This realized power is quickly ceded in
other realms (like other elections), where former majority and minority
statuses return and former dynamics of control remain.
B. Rethinking Majoritarianismin the Context of the Jury
Second order diversity offers the tempting possibility to think of juries
as a sort of quasi-electoral process. Electoral processes seek the inclusion
of an array of voters, and so offer representation to varying perspectives in
any given community. That any given representative may lose an election,
or fail to represent accurately every perspective in his community, does not
undo the reality that each eligible voter in the community had the
opportunity to vote and will, at least in theory, have that opportunity again.
The enfranchisement model, after all, depends on an acceptance that there
is an inherent value in the unfettered opportunity of all eligible voters to
vote.

158. Madison was a proponent of majority-thwarting factions, suggesting larger or even at-large
election districts as a means of precluding constant control of single groups. See THE FEDERALIST No.

10, at 82-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323-25 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). While his description of such voting districts was limited to a
discussion of electoral power, the same logic would seem to apply to any decision-making body in
which entrenched majorities might be created based on proportionality.

159.

See Gerken, supra note 5, at 1136-39 (acknowledging that this may be problematic).
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In a nation where voting rights remain a central and contested
battlefield in an ongoing struggle for civil rights and equality, 160 the
proposition that an equal opportunity to vote matters is sound, but the right
to vote alone is insufficient.161 For all its symbolic and actual importance,
there is a disconnect between the act and those possibilities latent in the act.
Even in the most educated and involved electoral population, in voting we
seek some imperfect alignment of our own values and identities in an array
of representatives and positions. Each of us prioritizes and abandons parts
of ourselves in the name of compromise and consensus (or undoubtedly at
times in the resignation of the best available option). The extent to which
these compromises occur may vary depending on the nature of the election
itself, but even diluted, they persist.' 62
This reality of electoral compromise is both valuable and necessary. To
vote, whether for a candidate or issue, is to act prospectively and abstractly.
My own vote for Bill de Blasio in November 2012 did not cause universal
Pre-K to magically appear, or class differences in New York City to
instantly dissipate, even though I understood in voting for him that he
supported both causes.1 6 3 I lent him my support and my vote because I
understood that he would push for the realizations of both of these central
tenets of his campaign. The implementation of either is a complex political
struggle that I may witness only from the sidelines, as my own values are
buffeted and at times abandoned for the sake of the compromises that
eventually, hopefully, will produce some Pre-K and some increase in
economic equity.
But whether we are talking about the election of a mayor or a president
or the legalization of marijuana, or the sanctioning of gay marriage, in
voting we are looking forward to what the candidate or the law can be, not
what it will be or even is. Jurors do not enjoy the benefit of that distance. In
rendering a verdict, jurors remove the law from the realm of the abstract
and ground it (sometimes both literally and figuratively) into the life of the
defendant. They do not wonder who will someday be arrested under the
law or what defense might be raised in response. In the realm of the case
before them, they know. In their deliberations, the jurors contemplate the
past as constructed through the evidence presented, the present in the very
160.

See generally Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).

161,

See GUINIER, supra note 155; Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights

Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991); Samuel Issacharoff,
Comment, Beyond the DiscriminationModel on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95 (2013).
162.
See GUINIER, supra note 155, at 65-66 (arguing that localized elections may more
accurately represent communities than national ones).

163.

See http://www.billdeblasio.com/issues (defining de Blasio's position as a mayoral

candidate with universal Pre-K and equalization of wealth distribution through the "millionaires" tax
listed prominently).
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real terms of the defendant and victim before them, and the future as they
wonder how their decision will shape the world going forward. To occupy
this position, simultaneously imagining a past, present, and future of law, is
a rare space. It renders jurors distinct from other voters and the jury distinct
from other electoral processes.1 64
Jury service is different from electoral processes for other reasons as
well. Juries are by their nature small and local in ways that few elections
are. In addition, juries lack the anonymity that voting promises. Jurors not
only live with each other outside the jury room, but in the jury room.
Unlike voting, jury deliberation is not a solitary process. Jurors argue and
debate with one another in an effort to push the verdict forward. In the
process, their values may be buffeted, suppressed, or altered.1 65 In
considering the value of second order diversity, the reality of deliberation
suggests that meaningful dissent will occur only in moments when minority
voices become the majority.
This reality of juror deliberation and the distinct nature of the questions
that jurors seek to answer suggest that a conversation about second order
diversity alone is insufficient. Instead, it is helpful to move the
conversation about juries away from conversations about majoritarianism
that dominate the electoral debates and the literature on voting, and to
recognize the uniqueness of the jury as a democratic institution. Jurors,
forced to examine the law in the context of their own lives and the lives of
the defendant before them, occupy a unique democratic space that requires
them, in the course of deliberation, to constantly rethink their own
identities, allegiances, and expectations of government. For the vast
majority of jurors this may not be a weighty proposition-narratives that
resonate will emerge and verdicts will be rendered with an almost expected
routineness. But in moments when jurors find themselves confounded by
the formal construct of law, their vital potential emerges and their verdicts
cannot only open space for different perspectives, but can actually push for
a more nuanced construct of the law itself-even if only in the realm of a
single case. In this sense, the jury owes no allegiance to the values of a
"majority." Such a majority may not exist in the space of these jury rooms.
Instead they owe their allegiance to the process of engaging with their
fellow citizens in an effort to discern both what the law is and can be when
164.
This is not to say that the opportunity for jury service is not an opportunity for
enfranchisement and representation. It is. Just as it is important to create a voting system that gives all
citizens a chance to vote, it is important to create a jury selection system that gives all citizens a chance
to be jurors. And just like voting, the chance to serve is not enough. The chance to be heard matters as
well. It matters for many of the reasons the chance to be heard matters in other electoral processes-the

idea that, in casting their ballot, their vision of the world may be realized, however imperfectly.
Because of the realities of the jury system, however, it matters differently for jurors.

165.

See supra notes 100-145 and accompanying text.
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it is applied in the context of the criminal case before them. That second
order diversity may allow those unique perspectives to emerge, or may
trigger a reconsideration of one's identity allegiances, is critical to this
function.
This unique democratic function may well counsel not toward a jury
composition that neatly reflects community populations on each jury, but
rather toward equity in composition over time to assure the development of
the genuine dissent critical to the deliberative process and-at times-the
creation of a majority on a jury that stands in stark contrast to that which
empowered formal actors. In doing so, the accepted dichotomy of
integration or segregation falls by the wayside and a far more complex
landscape of diversity jurisprudence emerges. This new jurisprudence
recognizes the unique function of the jury and seeks to modify conceptions
of diversity to accomplish the function in light of what is known both about
group decision-making processes and the role of the jury as a democratic
institution. It is a solution that finds purchase in the proposition that some
decision-making bodies do and should look nothing like the populations
from which they are drawn.
C. Rethinking Vicinage
Girding this conversation about second order diversity and
majoritarianism is the more fundamental question of how juries themselves
are chosen. Historically, vicinage was crucial to the Founders' conception
of the jury as a source of local values and as a check on formal
government.' 6 6 Concerns that government would create, apply, and
166.

Originally, the Constitution held no requirement for local juries. See U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 2,

cl. 3. Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution seized on this omission, which was in sharp
contrast to the common law's requirement that juries be selected from the county where the crime
occurred. See ABRAMSON, supra note 83, at 22 (discussing anti-Federalist reaction to the lack of a local
jury requirement); BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at 344 (defining the common law term of vicinage to
mean that jurors must be drawn from "the county where the fact is committed"). The anti-Federalists
reasoned that, without local juries, verdicts would no longer reflect the sentiment of the communities
most affected by the alleged crime and the judicial system could become a forum for tyranny. See
ABRAMSON, supra note 83, at 22. To the anti-Federalist, the thought of removing a trial from the
community in which the crime allegedly occurred smacked of colonial tactics to try accused traitors in
England in front ofjurors more sympathetic to the crown or at least less sympathetic to the colonies, as

opposed to in America where their treason allegedly had occurred. See id at 22-23 (describing the
British government's efforts to quash the budding revolt by bringing colonists to England to be tried in
front of "hostile jurors" and perceptions among anti-Federalists that the federal government's efforts to
eradicate local jurors amounted to little more than forum shopping).
In contrast, the Federalists advocated a broader jury pool in order to prevent conviction or acquittal

based on the juror's extrajudicial knowledge of the case. See id. at 26. This was particularly crucial to
those who recognized the tenuous state of the federal government. As James Madison noted, forces of
rebellion still existed and there were those who even post-Revolution were displeased with the
establishment of a centralized government. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
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interpret laws that were contrary to the citizens' own values were alleviated
by the implementation of the vicinage system--designed to ensure that at
the end of the day, after all other formal exercises of discretion within the
criminal justice system, questions of culpability were local.1 6 7 This
construction of the jurisdiction, and so its source of venire panels, is
geographically based. Like electoral districts, vicinage is a product of the
citizen's physical residency.' 68 It does not seek to account for other aspects
of the citizen's identity-though certainly the initial construction of the
geographic boundary may consider this. On some fundamental level, this
geographically constructed vicinage makes sense. Whatever disputes may
periodically arise around the reconfiguration of a particular jurisdiction,
there is some underlying ease in drawing a physical line to demarcate a
boundary. 169
But this historical allegiance to geographically based vicinage may not
make sense for several reasons. First, geographically based vicinage was
linked to a jury system in which a limited and homogenous population was
eligible to be jurors. 170 To the extent that this population might inject an
alternative perspective into the law through its verdicts or might serve as a
correction in the face of overly aggressive government action, it does so
despite the fact it shared the immutable traits of the ruling class, and was
often the ruling class. In our brave new world in which formerly ineligible
persons may serve on juries and by their service may push discussions of
culpability in different directions, their geographic location may become
less significant to the realization of the jury's larger function. Second, and
not unrelated, such geographical definitions of jurisdictions may neglect to
account for the disproportionate impact of other discretionary decisions on
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 537 (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1907) (1836). Madison
feared that to require local juries in the trials of such rebels would end in disaster and ultimately result
in disunion of the federal government. See id; see also 2 id. at 112-13 (noting that Massachusetts
delegate Christopher Gore argued that the continuation of the common law tradition of local juries
risked inconsistent and biased verdicts). In these debates, Jeffrey Abramson notes, there was an internal
tension between notions of what justice is and should be: should it be decided by local juries who truly
reflected the community's sense of culpability or should it be determined by juries drawn from farther
afield who were less likely to be biased and more likely to protect the new federal government? See
ABRAMSON, supra note 83, at 26; see also Middlebrooks, supra note 17, at 388 (2004) ("Revolutionary
colonials refused to define law as an instrument of the state which could not be judged by the common
man. Rather, they viewed it as the reflection of their community which ordinary men were equally
capable of judging for themselves.").
167. See ABRAMSON, supra note 83, at 22; Middlebrooks, supra note 17, at 388.
168. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions,67 VAND. L. REv. 89,

101-02 (2014).
169. See Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 20-23 (2013);
Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court 2003 Term-Foreword:The ConstitutionalizationofDemocratic

Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 114-15 (2004); Issacharoff, supra note 161, at 113.
170.

See Carroll,The Jury's Second Coming, supra note 17, at 699-701.
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particular populations.17 1 Not coincidentally, these populations tend to be
among the most marginalized in other formal spheres. 7 2 If part of the
jury's value is its ability to reconfigure notions of "majority" and offer an
opportunity for divergent perspectives to surface, then the ability to achieve
this value is enhanced if the construction of venire panels acknowledges
these functions jettisoning geographically based notions of vicinage in
favor of an approach that considers the identities of those who would be
called. The venire selection would still be randomized in the sense that no
particular person would be called, but the pool from which the randomized
venire was chosen would consider factors beyond the potential juror's
geographic location.
Logistically, this reconception of vicinage is difficult and raises some
of the fundamental questions underlying all discussions of jury
composition. How would vicinage be defined? Which identity traits would
drive the construction of the venire? Which governmental body would
make such choices? Would they be constant, or near constant, as existing
jurisdictional bounds are? Or would they shift with different charges and
different defendants? To the extent that they offer the benefit of accounting
for the disproportionate effect of lawmaking, application, and interpretative
discretion, how should the effect be measured? Do those who live in a high
crime or high crime enforcement neighborhood have an interest that
exceeds those who feel the collateral effects of such crime and enforcement
decisions?
These are questions that will ultimately need to be answered in light of
the larger function we hope the jury can realize. Like notions of second
diversity and reconstruction of majoritarianism around juries, they may
well require a fundamental change in how we think about the question of
jury composition. But to consider them is to open the possibility that the
jury can more effectively achieve its democratic potential while still
promoting a sense of legitimacy in the system in which it moves.
CONCLUSION

In the criminal justice system, juries serve different functions. The
Court's current description of the jury alludes to a larger democratic
function that has long operated in the shadow of more formally constructed
law. In this description, the jury is a space in which citizens engage directly
with the law and the formal powers that control it. In this realm the

171.

See Butler, supra note 18.
172. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969);
ANGELA J. DAVIS, supra note i, at 33-39.

870

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 66:4:825

composition of the jury matters and cannot be divorced from the discussion
of its function. As different communities bear a disproportionate burden of
lawmaking, application, and interpretation, notions of jury composition
must shift to acknowledge this reality. Just as allegiance to directly
proportional petit juries emerges as contrary to the larger democratic
function of the jury, so geographically defined jurisdictions cease to make
sense as the only valid source of a venire. Instead, jury composition should
be reimagined as a forum to embrace the citizen's fluid identity and to
promote diverse perspectives within democracy.

